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Abstract 
The Levant Basin has become an increasingly hot political issue in the Middle East and Southern 
Europe. Many countries like Greece, Lebanon, and Cyprus see the basin’s new energy 
possibilities as an important economic tool to guide their struggling economies. Others like 
Turkey, Syria and Egypt see it as a threat. Israel, the most advanced country in exploration, has 
begun the search for the best political and economic partners to develop the country’s energy 
sector.  Due to the geopolitical implications of natural resources, the possible changes in the 
balance of power that may arise, or the increased potential importance of the region to great 
powers, this thesis attempts to cover the likely political outcomes of the energy resources by 
exploring the different possible cooperation schemes among regional powers. This thesis 
explores cooperation scenarios between Israel and the other regional powers in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, Egypt, Greece, and Turkey. Using the liberal theories of international regimes 
and cooperation, this thesis investigates the possibilities of partnerships between the Levant 
powers and the feasibility of regime formation. We find that the most prominent candidates for 
fostering natural gas regimes are Israeli-Egyptian and Israeli-Turkish partnerships. To explore 
their potential, I model regime building, as expressed in Robert Keohane’s theory of 
international regimes, by applying David Axelrod’s iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) to 
envision the conditions of cooperation or defection from the proposed partnerships.   
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1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Deputy Chairman of the Turkish Development and Justice party (AKP) Omar Celik declared, 
“We have shown clearly to everyone that we will not allow the Eastern Mediterranean to become 
a Greek-Cyprus-Israel goal”. The Turkish leader was speaking in response to deployed F15s by 
Israel over a Turkish seismic ship exploring for natural gas in September 2011.
1
  The increased 
exploration and licensing activity in the Eastern Mediterranean comes amidst three sizable 
natural gas findings in the Levant Basin and a U.S. Geological survey (USGS) report. The report 
estimates that the Levant Basin contains a mean of 1.7 billion barrels of recoverable oil and 122 
trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of recoverable gas.
2
 In comparison, the United States proven recoverable 
reserves are estimated around 300 Tcf of natural gas,
3
 122 Tcf is hardly a game-changer for 
global markets. But, regionally, natural gas reserves in the Levant basin can play a paramount 
role in the market and shifting geopolitical interests.  
The Levant countries are strategically positioned to deliver gas to the European Union’s 
(EU) 27 countries and Turkey.  In 2013, the EU27 imported almost 11 Tcf, 43% of which came 
from Russia.
4
 In 2011, Turkey imported 1.5 Tcf with more than half coming from Russia.
5
 
Figures indicated in the survey, if recoverable, would make the Eastern Mediterranean countries 
pivotal players in the regional energy market. According to the World Bank, the total population 
of the Levant Basin countries (Palestine, Israel, Cyprus, Syria, and Lebanon) is 39.9 million, or 
                                                        
1
 "Israeli Jets 'buzz Turkish Drill Ship'" UPI. September 30, 2011. Accessed March 15, 2013. 
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2011/09/30/Israeli-jets-buzz-Turkish-drill-ship/UPI-52831317402419/.  
2
 Schenk, C.J., Kirschbaum, M.A., Charpentier, R.R., Klett, T.R., Brownfield, M.E., Pitman, J.K., Cook, T.A., and Tennyson, M.E., 
2010, Assessment of undiscovered oil and gas resources of the Levant Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean: U.S. Geological 
Survey Fact Sheet 2010-3014, 4 p. 
3
 "BP." Statistical Review of World Energy 2013. Accessed April 18, 2013. http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-
bp/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy-2013.html.  
4
 "International Energy Statistics." Energy Information Agency. Accessed May 15, 2013. 
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=3&pid=26&aid=1&cid=CG1,&syid=2008&eyid=2012&unit=BCF.  
5
"Turkey." U.S. Energy Information Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics and Analysis. February 1, 2013. Accessed March 
23, 2013. http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=TU.  
 
 
2 
less than 8% of the total population of the United States.
6
 Per capita reserves are much higher 
than those of the United States. This makes energy independence a reachable target, which is an 
important strategic goal for the currently energy dependent countries. Fields already explored 
can shift these energy dependent countries to strategic natural gas actors pending optimization of 
their export potential.  
Three medium-size field discoveries have been made in the Levant Basin. In 2009, a 
consortium of Noble Energy (a Houston-based firm) and three Israeli partner firms discovered 
the Tamar field with a mean estimate of 9.7 Tcf. In the following year, another consortium 
explored one of the largest natural gas finds in a decade, Leviathan, which was estimated to have 
17-20 Tcf. In 2011, in drilling block 12 in Cyprus, Aphrodite field was discovered containing an 
estimated 3-9 Tcf.
7
 To fully optimize production from these fields, both Israel and Cyprus must 
create an export strategy. Israel has discovered other fields that contain small amounts of natural 
gas such as Tanin, containing an estimated 1.2 Tcf, and Mari-B and Noa, containing a combined 
of 1.5 Tcf.
8
 Israeli natural gas consumption was only 117 billion cubic feet (Bcf) in 2011, while 
Cyprus does not use natural gas. Both countries have plans to increase their consumption of 
natural gas, but national consumption will not be enough to explore these large fields optimally. 
Cyprus and Israel are in a more advanced stage in their discoveries than other countries. 
Other governments surrounding the Levantine Basin have been much slower to develop a 
scheme of contracting and awarding exploration rights. Syria has been stuck in political 
meltdown since 2011; the Syrian civil war has hampered any effort by the government to explore 
offshore discoveries. In December 2013, Syria’s government signed a 25-year deal with the 
                                                        
6
 figures gathered from World Bank Data on population 
7
 Darbouche, Hakim, Laura Katiri, and Bassam Fattouh. "East Mediterranean Gas – What Kind of a Game-changer?" Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies. December 2012. Accessed January 21, 2013. http://www.oxfordenergy.org/2012/12/east-
mediterranean-gas-what-kind-of-a-game-changer/.  
8
 ibid  
 
 
3 
Russian firm but no development has been made yet.
9
 Lebanon, on the other hand, has been 
much slower than Cyprus and Israel on the issue. Lebanon carried out its first offshore licensing 
round in February 2013, but exploration and production agreements are not expected until early 
2014.
10
 Lebanon’s political instability has not helped the situation. Continuous fear of the next 
civil war, spreading Syrian conflict, and the dicey confessional politics of Lebanon have created 
difficulties in Lebanon’s effort to move forward on offshore licensing. Since its sovereign debt 
crisis, Greece has been increasingly looking for a natural gas-bonanza to bail-out its troubled 
economy. While Greece is not in the Levant basin, other bodies of water in the Mediterranean 
exhibit many of the same geophysical structures.
11
Greece has commissioned a Norwegian 
company to conduct a seismic survey in 2012 and the government seeks to hold a licensing 
round in 2014.
12
 Greece is moving forward with plans for exploration, although it lags behind the 
already made discoveries in the Levant Basin. Its unlikely that any explored fields could be used 
to facilitate joint export facilities with Israel. Egypt is another regional player in the gas market. 
Egypt has served as an exporter to global natural gas markets. In 2012, Egypt’s LNG capacity 
served Europe and Asia and its pipelines served closer markets in Israel and Jordan.
13
 Israel’s 
quick success in gas exploration can be traced to its overreliance on Egypt.  But Egypt’s gas 
potential has not been fulfilled due to the political volatility inside the country. Since January 
2011, Egypt has experienced a wave of political turmoil handicapping government initiated 
                                                        
9
 "Syria Inks Oil, Gas Deal with Russia Firm." Yahoo! News. December 25, 2013. Accessed January 23, 2014. 
http://news.yahoo.com/syria-signs-major-oil-exploration-deal-russia-130615285.html.  
10
 Nakhle, Carole. "Gas: Lebanon Needs a Clear and Robust Framework to Address the Challenges Ahead." LCPS. January 2013. 
Accessed February 23, 201. http://www.lcps-lebanon.org/featuredArticle.php?id=11.  
11
 Bruneton, Alain, Elias Konofagos, and Anthony E. Foscolos. "The Importance of Eastern Mediterranean Gas Fields for Greece 
and the EU." Pytheas Investor Service. January 2011. Accessed November 25, 2013. 
http://www.pytheas.net/docs/20120119%20The%20Economic%20and%20Geopolitical%20importance%20of%20Eastern%20M
editerranean%20gas%20fields%20for%20Greece%20and%20the%20EU.pdf.  
12
 Pappas, John. "Mediterranean Sea Plays Offer New Opportunities." Offshore. October 7, 2013. Accessed November 23, 2013. 
http://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/print/volume-73/issue-7/offshore-mediterranean/mediterranean-sea-plays-offer-new-
opportunities.html.  
13
 "Egypt." U.S. Energy Information Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics and Analysis. July 31, 2013. Accessed August 
30, 2013. http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=EG.  
 
 
4 
market reforms, increasing security risks, and deterring foreign investments. Egypt’s natural gas 
supplies to Israel were halted and its supplies to Jordan have been steadily decreasing. In 
addition, financial woes have caused energy shortages and government subsidies continue 
increasing economic inefficiencies and unabated consumption. However, these changes present 
opportunities for Israeli natural gas flow to Jordan and Egypt.  
Israel’s Knesset created the “Tazmach committee” in 2011 to evaluate the country’s 
natural gas policy and make suggestions for the allocation of Israeli natural gas for the export 
market. The committee recommended in August 2012 that 53% of proven reserves be available 
for export in an effort to encourage the development of Israel’s natural gas sector.14 The Israeli 
cabinet approved a law that would allow Israel to export 40% of production and keep 60%. This 
decision is designed to keep Israel energy sufficient for at least 25 years given current levels of 
reserves.
15
 Such quantities would make Israel a viable exporter of natural gas. Cyprus on the 
other hand, has great interest in partnering with Israel. Cypriot natural gas findings could use 
excess Israeli gas to create economies of scale. Cypriot and Israeli production, if combined and 
transported, could be a viable option for both countries.  
The quantities found in fields like the Leviathan and Aphrodite promise to make the 
Levant Basin countries a regional player in the natural gas sector, but the inability to export 
diminish incentives for further exploration of the projected 122 Tcf of natural gas. The conflict 
and political implications that may arise in the Eastern Mediterranean are many. The first 
pressing issue is territorial water demarcation. As Part of the 1994 United Nations Convention of 
the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), the concept of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) gives the 
                                                        
14
 Trilnick, Ital, and Avi Bar-El. "Tzemach Panel Would Allocate 84% of Gas Reserves for Export." Haaretz. August 29, 2012. 
Accessed January 28, 2013. http://www.haaretz.com/business/tzemach-panel-would-allocate-84-of-gas-reserves-for-export-
1.461281.  
15
 Assis, Claudia. "Israel Clarifies Gas Export Policy: We’re Keeping 60%." Marketwatch. June 19, 2013. Accessed September 15, 
2013. http://blogs.marketwatch.com/energy-ticker/2013/06/19/israel-clarifies-gas-export-policy-were-keeping-60/.  
 
 
5 
right to countries to exploit 
outward of 12 nautical miles 
of their continental shelf up-
to 200 nautical miles. If 
countries have close borders, 
bilateral agreements among 
neighbors delineate these 
lines. Negotiating the claims 
of the respective EEZs 
complicates the energy strategy of each country; especially in a region where many countries do 
not recognize each other’s existence.16 Lebanon has already claimed that part of the Leviathan 
field extends into its maritime border.
17
 Lebanon has not ratified its EEZ agreement with Cyprus 
in protest of Cyprus’s agreement with Israel.18 As we can see in figure 1, Lebanon claims point 
23 as part of it EEZ, while Israel only accepts point 1 to be Lebanon’s EEZ.19  
In addition, the ongoing conflict between Cyprus and Turkey complicates regional 
strategies for exports. Turkey is the only country in the world to recognize the Turkish Republic 
of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Turkey has claimed that no drilling will occur unless Cyprus and 
Turkish Cyprus can agree on distributing revenue from natural resources. Turkey has also 
                                                        
16
  "Lebanon, Cyprus to Review Offshore Energy." UPI. January 19, 2013. Accessed May 23, 2013. 
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2013/01/09/Lebanon-Cyprus-to-review-offshore-energy/UPI-
18571357742986/.  
17
Comments: Lebanon has made a formal request to the United Nations disputing the Israeli-Cypriot agreement but the UN 
refused to mediate. On July 5, 2013, Lebanon’s energy minister claimed that Israel is siphoning Lebanese gas by drilling in 
nearby blocks. In July 13, 2013, the United States announced it willingness to mediate the dispute between Israel and Lebanon. 
18
 "Cyprus-Lebanon, Cyprus-Israel Offshore Delimitation." Middle East Economic Survey. October 1, 2012. Accessed June 23, 
2013. http://www.mees.com/en/articles/6015-cyprus-lebanon-israel-ofshore-delimitation.  
19
 Stocker, James. "No EEZ Solution: The Politics of Oil and Gas in the Eastern Mediterranean." The Middle East Journal 66, no. 4 
(Autumn 2012): 579-97.  
Figure 1: Map of claimed maritime borders between Israel and Lebanon.  
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pressured Lebanon into not ratifying a bilateral agreement made with Cyprus.
20
 On the other 
hand, further political tension in the region arising from potential hyper-nationalism--expressed 
in the so-called “Arab Spring”--is adding to pre-existing tension, thereby raising the likelihood 
for conflict. 
The energy riches of the Levant basin represent both opportunity and risk to the 
Mediterranean region. Multilateral cooperation can mitigate the risks of natural gas discoveries. 
But many countries on the basin do not have diplomatic relations with one-another, which 
enhances political risks and complicate strategies for export. Unlike exporting hydrocarbons such 
as oil that require very little coordination, natural gas is characterized by regional markets, large 
facilities, pre-existing sales contracts, and long-horizon investment outlook. These characteristics 
require the facilitation of rules, agreements, and behavioral coordination. The formation of a 
natural gas issue-area regime will optimize benefits for the region and enhance the possibilities 
of cooperation. Regional powers, Israel, Egypt, Turkey and Greece, have strong interests to 
advance regional stability and develop economic benefits.  
1.1 Questions and Hypothesis 
The natural gas discoveries in the Levant can present an opportunity similar to the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which developed by regional powers in Western Europe 
after World War Two (WWII). ECSC formed the bases of an economic and political framework 
for the regulation of coal and steel between France, West Germany, Italy and Benelux countries. 
ECSC experts regulated polices regarding steel and coal to enhance the economic benefits of 
both industries.
21
 It also fostered an environment of political interactions for the common benefit 
                                                        
20
 ibid 
21
 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)," accessed February 13, 
2014,http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/196004/European-Coal-and-Steel-Community. 
 
 
7 
of its actors. As the precursor to the creation of the European Community, the ECSC can be seen 
as a foundational regime base negotiated by regional powers to avoid future conflict and enhance 
economic cooperation. Similar to the ECSC, political and economic cooperation is required to 
enhance the regulation and economic benefits of natural gas in the Levant basin.  
This thesis will investigate the feasibility of regime formation on the Levant Basin 
around Israeli natural gas exports. Because of the complexities of creating a multilateral regime 
in the region, I will investigate three separate bilateral foundations for a regime base. I study 
three separate alternative bilateral initial regime bases between Israel and the other regional 
powers. These three alternative foundational regime bases are 1) Israel-Egypt with the possibility 
of enlarging cooperation to Jordan and Palestine, 2) Israel-Turkey with the possibility of 
engaging Cyprus, Greece, Lebanon, and Syria, and 3) Israel-Greece with the future of attracting 
Cyprus, Lebanon and Turkey.  
Regime theory is used as an avenue of analysis to the subject of issue-area cooperation. 
The questions asked by regime theorist are similar to those questions we seek to answer.  These 
questions are: Under what conditions do nations cooperate? And at what point does cooperation 
become a regime? These are the same questions that this thesis attempts to answer about the 
future of the Levant Basin. The utility of looking at regime formation in this thesis is imbedded 
in the properties of natural gas, which requires long-term horizon planning and coordination. The 
infrastructure costs of natural gas necessitate pre-planned export markets that are often regional. 
In addition, large facilities for offshore natural gas involve extensive security planning and 
protection. Regime theory has consistently provided the theoretical analysis for issue-area 
cooperation between states. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
 
8 
In this thesis, I seek to use the tools of liberal regime theory to answer two main 
questions. First, what is the most optimal cooperation for exporting natural gas and setting up a 
regime? Second, is this bilateral regime base politically viable? I hypothesize that the most 
optimal cooperation partners for exporting Israeli natural gas and creating a foundation for a 
regime are Egypt and Turkey. But without compromises on the regional territorial conflicts, 
notably Cyprus-Turkey and Arab Israeli, the likelihood of initial bilateral cooperation 
diminishes and the possibility of defection from cooperation could lead to an increase in conflict.  
1.2 Methodology and Chapters breakdown 
This study applies both primary and secondary data. Primary data is collected from energy 
agencies and news articles relevant to the political and economic role of natural gas in the 
Levant. Secondary data is collected from conceptual and theoretical perspectives on cooperation, 
historical data on political economy cooperation, and foreign policy literature associated with 
relevant countries. Using these data, I analyze the most economically and politically viable 
foundational regime base available for cooperation on Israeli natural gas exports. After choosing 
the most optimal bilateral cooperation partner for Israel, I use the concept of an iterated 
prisoner’s dilemma model (IPD) to envision possibilities of bilateral cooperation for founding a 
gas regime.  
The remainder of this chapter, I introduce a literature review of the theoretical and 
conceptual frameworks I use to tackle the subject of cooperation and regime building in the 
Levant Basin. In addition, I review the literature about natural gas discoveries in the Levant 
Basin. The review of theoretical literature sheds light on the utility of regime theory and the 
concept of an IPD to our investigation. In the second chapter, I discuss and present a brief history 
of the EU-Russia natural gas regime to make clear what a natural gas regime might look like and 
 
 
9 
what are the foundational bases for establishing such a regime. Chapter two also informs our 
opinion about the alternatives to the IPD and allows us to choose cooperation that has the best 
chance of morphing into a regime. In chapter three, I present the historical bilateral relations of 
the most feasible regime base to identify patterns of political cooperation. In chapter four, I use 
the political patterns identified in the previous chapter to examine the environment for 
cooperation in the Levant Basin. The first section presents Israeli energy policy and objectives 
for the natural gas resources. I use historical political patterns to examine the current state of 
bilateral relations between Israel and the chosen foundational regime base. I then present the IPD 
scenarios for cooperation and defection. In the final section of chapter four, I highlight external 
powers motivations regarding the Levant basin and their ability to impact the outcome. In 
Chapter five, I conclude the findings of the study and attempt to make predictions based on the 
tested hypothesis.  
1.3 Purpose of Study 
This study seeks to contribute to the field of political science by examining the ability of regime 
theory to explain regime formation. This study uses regime theory as a tool for understanding the 
interest-based incentives of conflicting states, and analyzes the context of these interests in the 
international system and world politics. This study places regime theory under a different scope 
of analysis. It attempts to apply the theoretical underpinnings of regime formation in the Levant 
region. Using regime theory as an intervening variable for cooperation, I then investigate the 
probabilities of cooperation by formulating an IPD for the various alternatives for bilateral 
regime bases. In this thesis, I focus on the iterated two-player model. For Israel to optimize 
natural gas production it must find at least one export route. If Israel chooses to export without 
finding a regional partner, it will likely exacerbate tensions because of the naval capabilities 
 
 
10 
required to protect natural gas facilities. In addition, finding a regional export partner produces 
better economic gain for Israel. Thus, Israel will likely look for one regional partner to export its 
natural resource. This represents initial cooperation, which in the future could turn into a regional 
regime based on natural gas cooperation.  
I also seek to understand the future of the riches in the Levant Basin. The research 
method intends to predict future foreign policy outcomes of states regarding natural resources. 
Given the transitional political variables, territorial rivalries, and its dominance in the global 
natural resources market, the Middle East is a very unique region. The countries competing for 
the Levant Basin constitute one of the most politically volatile areas in the world. This political 
volatility arises from a lack of mutual recognition. The Levant also continues to exhibit immense 
importance for great powers. Examining the role of a new variable, natural resources, is very 
important for the strategic development of national foreign policies of great powers and regional 
states.  
1.4  Literature Review 
1.4.1 Theoretical & Conceptual Framework 
International relations scholars continue to exhibit great interests in researching cooperation 
amongst nations. Over the past 40 years, regime theory has become the leading tool in analyzing 
sustained cooperation between various national actors. However, realism (and its variances) and 
liberalism (and its variances) have sharp disagreements about the formation, utility, and the 
sustainability of regimes. Realists assume that states focus on each other’s relative gains causing 
defection rather cooperation. That being said, realism has evolved into acknowledging 
cooperation among states in international regimes. But liberal internationalists and realists 
disagree on the fundamental condition under which states value gains. Liberals argue that states 
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focus on absolute gain while realists argue that states value relative gains.
22
 Realists contend that 
cooperation between states in anarchical structure is much like a prisoner’s dilemma where 
actors coordinate in the form of an alliance. To counter this, liberals suggested that interactions 
among states are in a repetitive prisoner’s dilemma making long-run cooperation sustainable.23 
These repetitive transactions cause states to engage in a regime. In our case study, I survey the 
feasibility of building a regime on the Levant Basin based on initial cooperation between the 
various regional powers. The two-player model illustrates the foundational regime base. For 
instance, other countries can utilize the natural gas infrastructure of the cooperating foundational 
two states. The main question of this thesis attempts to answer if cooperation between the 
various regional powers can be attained. Cooperation does not necessarily involve a regime. But 
regimes can only evolve out of cooperation. 
 Identifying regimes has always been a very complex task for political scientists. 
According to Oran Young, regimes are “social institutions governing the actions of those 
involved in specifiable activities or sets of activities. Like all social institutions, they are 
practices consisting of recognized roles linked together by clusters of rules or conventions 
governing relations among the occupants of these rules”.24 In their influential book Power and 
Interdependence, Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane identify regimes as “networks of rules, 
norms, and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects”. Their definition is 
associated with regimes that are shaped by institutional outcomes.
 25
 On the other hand, Duncan 
Sindal offers a realist view of regime theory. The theory of hegemonic stability “claims that the 
                                                        
22
 Powell, Robert. "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory." The American Political Science Review 85, no. 
4 (December 1991): 1303-320.  
23
 Fearon, James D. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation." International Organization 52.2 (1998): 269-305. 
Print. 
24
 Young, Oran R. International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1989. Pg 12-13. 
25
 Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. Power and Interdependence. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1989. Pg 19.  
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presence of a single, strongly dominant actor in international politics leads to collectively 
desirable outcomes for all states in the international system”.26 Charles Lipson says that regimes 
should be analyzed as outcomes or as institutions “mediating economic and political 
discourse”.27 Thus, regimes are thought of as an intervening variable, a conduit to cooperation 
for states. This cooperation can be implicit, and it is on a specific issue. Stephen Krasner has 
provided the most widely used definition of regimes. In his book International Regimes, Krasner 
defines a regime as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations”.28 This definition balances other definitions by introducing a loose structure of the 
regime. Krasner essentially says it is a regime when and if there is convergent behavior among 
actors around an issue-area. For example, Keohane and Nye suggest two different types of 
regimes. The first type of regime is made through a treaty or an arrangement of written rules 
such as General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The second type is founded based on 
implicit behavior like the postwar American-Canadian relationship.
29
 Repeated cooperation on 
an issue-area creates a pattern leading to the social norms and cooperative patterns of behavior. 
This channel of cooperation is a regime. While realists and liberals agree on the existence of 
regimes, they continue to disagree about the environment of international and domestic relations 
that cause regimes.   
According to Hasenclever, the realist school of thought focuses on power relations while 
the liberal school of thought claims regimes arise out of interests.
30
 Keohane, a functional liberal 
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theorist, maintains that, in the absence of hegemony, a demand for regimes may increase because 
of the transaction-reducing role that regimes play in international cooperation.
31
 For liberals, 
regimes can be maintained or destroyed through interest-based models; but realists, who distrust 
the efficacy of shared common interests, focus on the interests and capabilities of the hegemon to 
coerce actors into a regime. In the realist tradition, powerful states act as a privileged group and 
agree to maintain stability though a set of enforced rules.
32
 Snidal’s theory of Hegemonic 
stability stresses that the dominant states can provide stable regimes and smaller states will be 
able to take advantage of the regime by free riding on its benefits.
33
 Interest-based theory 
provides two approaches. The first approach, contractualism, examines the ability of actors to 
cooperate in a condition that bears similarities to a prisoner’s dilemma. The second approach, 
situation structuralism, adds to the game-theoretic approach but also takes in a more strategic 
perspective of the structure of the international environment.
34
 Joseph Grieco argues that liberals 
underestimate the anarchical nature of international politics. He argues that the capacity of 
institutions does not mitigate the overwhelming structural importance of anarchy, which in-turn 
limits cooperation inter-state relations.
35
 
In the book Theories of International Regimes, Andreas Hansenclever provides a table 
highlighting the differences between the theoretical perspectives. It shows that realist and liberal 
theories consider actors rational. Hansenclever argues that one of the major differences between 
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the two theoretical foundations is institutionalism -- that is, the role of international institutions 
in the regime. Realists see the role of international institutions as weak, while liberalists find a 
stronger role for institutions in a regime.
36
 For realists, institutions simply display the 
configuration of power in the international system. Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons suggest 
that liberal regime theory can envision the existence of a regime but they have not been 
successful in identifying “how or when they will be supplied”.37 In his book Regime Theory and 
International Relations, Stephan Krasner discusses the differences between hegemonic stability 
theory and liberal functional regimes. Liberal co-operation theory works on altering incentives 
and overcoming market failure, relying on measuring absolute gains rather than relative gains. 
Realist cooperation looks at power distribution and actors’ monopolization of gains; where one 
actor wins, and the other actor lose.
38
 Impeding cooperation does not necessarily increase the 
gain of other nations in the Levant. Contractual liberal regimes put forward a situation that 
resembles the future interactions in the Levant basin. Actors in the Levant basin face multiple 
alternatives with different costs and incentives. Keohane suggests that problems of collective 
action in world politics lead to sub-optimal outcomes even if actors recognize mutual benefit 
from cooperation. This occurs because actors find that defection is the safest strategy. These 
costs and incentives as Keohane suggests are best understood by utilizing the prisoner’s 
dilemma.
39
 In After Hegemony, Keohane argues that if cooperation is to occur without a 
hegemon, these states must have complementary interests making certain cooperation 
attainable.
40
 On the other hand, realists like Stephen Krasner maintain that “hegemony of a 
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leading power” must exist for cooperation to work. 41  For Keohane, cooperation without a 
hegemon requires institutions or foresight by actors. For actors to cooperate without central 
authority or a hegemon, states must employ the strategy of reciprocity.
42
  
The iterated model is best represented by Robert Axelrod’s experiment of creating 
computer models to gauge the best strategy that produce cooperative behavior. The Evolution of 
Cooperation engages in an interdisciplinary understanding of cooperation. Axelrod finds that 
cooperation increases when actors use a Tit-for-Tat strategy. In an IPD situation, Axelrod 
concludes cooperation can become the dominant trait of the system even without central 
authority.
43
 IPD changes the actor’s calculation of a payoff. In addition to calculating immediate 
payoffs of defection, the actor must also calculate the opportunity cost of future payoffs.
44
 In his 
article Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy Kenneth Oye illustrates three common conditions 
of the prisoner’s dilemma. The first condition of cooperation occurs under “Payoff Structure: 
Mutual and Conflicting Preferences”, which describes how changes in payoffs for actors result in 
cooperation. The second, “Shadow of the Future: Single-play and Iterated games”, discusses the 
increase of cooperation with increased interaction. And the third, “Number of Players: Two 
person and N-person games”, explains the difficulty of cooperation when many actors are 
interacting in the same game. For cooperation to occur, Oye explains that the players must have 
mutual preferences, long shadow of the future, and the less the actors, the more likely 
cooperation.
45
 In the Levant basin, Israel is in a dilemma. It can choose to cooperate with its 
regional partners for greater economic payoffs but such economic payoffs require political 
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compromises. Additionally, the other regional powers are engaged in similar dilemma. If this 
dilemma can be resolved by the actors recognition of future payoffs, then it is possible to build 
an issue-area regime on natural gas cooperation. Cooperation in protecting offshore natural gas 
infrastructure would require security and military cooperation. The nature of natural gas as both 
political and economic could engage domestic actors allowing for future linkages.  
1.4.2 Natural Resources & The Levant Basin 
Resources have long played a role in international relations and conflict.  In The Prize, Daniel 
Yergin details the history of oil, arguing that it plays an overwhelmingly strategic role in the 
relations among nations. Yergin details the events that occurred in WWII to explain the strategic 
implications of oil.
46
 In his most recent book, The Quest, Yergin discusses the geopolitical role 
of oil and renewable industry in the post-Cold War era.
47
 Much has evolved since WWII. 
Military energy needs have changed; the legitimacy and political strength of national leaders 
have become tied to the economic welfare of citizens; and modern economies are now built on 
natural resources, especially petroleum products. In his book No War for Oil, Ivan Eland 
articulates that foreign policy is erroneously focused on securing energy. He argues that the role 
of the U.S. in securing energy supplies is inefficient and counterproductive.
48
 For natural gas, 
energy supplies is usually protected by regional partnerships due to the regional implications of 
natural gas trade. Natural gas has also been traded through regional pipelines rather than 
shipping lanes. In their book Oil Wars, Mary Kaldor, Terry Karl, and Yahia Said argue that 
attempting to secure the supply of energy by military means does more to disrupt supply than 
stabilize it. In addition, the authors argue that the nature of geopolitical wars has given way to 
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fierce domestic conflict over energy resources.
49 
The authors of this book differentiate the “old 
oil wars”, which are rooted in interstate geopolitical conflict, from “new oil wars” -- conflicts 
that combine a multi-function of greed, petro-states, and geopolitics. These new oil wars, they 
argue, are “both global and local, and thus the distinction between civil wars and cross-border or 
internationalized conflict is less relevant”.50 These arguments are mostly concerned with oil as 
the natural resources. While natural gas is similar to oil, there are many differences. These stark 
differences lie in the monetization of natural gas, which requires heavy infrastructure for 
transport and storage and future contracts for its sales. Historically, oil has been easier to 
discover, ship, and sell. In his book Resource Wars, Michael Klare argues that the conflict over 
natural resources will rise due to their scarcity and strategic potential. Klare mentions issues 
regarding the delineation of EEZs, disproportionate regional distribution of resources, and access 
to resources as key issues.
51
 Klare identifies resource competition as a zero-sum game where 
conflict rather than cooperation will emerge. Without cooperation in the Levant Basin, Klare’s 
scenario of conflict is likely to emerge. Some of these key issues have already emerged. 
Since the discovery of the Tamar gas field and the release of the USGS report, there has 
been an increased interest in the Levant Basin. In December 2012, researchers at the Oxford 
Institute of Energy Studies issued a report titled East Mediterranean Gas: what kind of a game-
changer? The authors argue that recent discoveries will not reach their export potential due to 
political issues but will play an important role in local energy markets
52
. Furthermore, James 
Stocker argues that cooperation is unlikely to emerge for “numerous reasons”. 53   Peter E. 
Paraschos echoes this sentiment in his recent article in the Mediterranean Quarterly. He explains 
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that “development of Israeli and Cypriot gas resources has aggravated regional rivalries,” but he 
stresses the important role that these sources could play in diversifying European natural gas 
supplies from Russia.
54
 The German Marshall Fund of the United States, which is associated 
with the National Defense University, has published a number of policy briefs concerning the 
issue of East Mediterranean energy. Brenda Shaffer concludes that the current levels of findings 
do not make the basin region a game changer in Europe. She also adds that the natural gas 
finding will help alleviate the tension on the region’s water resources and a reduction in pollution 
and that governments in the region “seem to overestimate the geopolitical benefits of existing gas 
finds”, which could lead to conflict over maritime borders. 55  Jeffrey Mankoff disagrees, 
concluding that the new gas discoveries may serve to decrease the dependence of the EU on 
Russian natural gas and help with the ongoing sovereign debt crises. He adds that the United 
States welcomes the new gas discovery but has expressed some reservation due to the potential 
escalation of conflict.
56
 Tullio Scovazzi explains that, while the new discoveries could bring 
great advantages to Israel, Cyprus, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories, maritime border 
disputes could cause escalating tensions and discourage international companies from developing 
the gas fields.
57
 Michael Koehler argues that the EU has great stake in Eastern Mediterranean 
resources, adding that it should play a huge role in facilitating cooperation. Koehler argues that 
the Eastern Mediterranean discoveries have the potential to serve the energy security interests of 
Cyprus (an EU member), Israel, and the Palestinian Authority, EU’s energy security, stability in 
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the region, and Turkey’s future EU candidacy.58 In a National Defense University report, Dr. 
Denise Natali discusses Israel and Cyprus’ inability to export gas via Turkey because of the 
political tensions. She calls on the US and the EU to assist Israel and Cyprus in developing 
mature natural gas markets and infrastructure for a possible diversification of EU natural gas 
imports from the Eastern Mediterranean. She also outlines the challenges of cooperation as both 
“technical and political”.59 Alternatively, the Turkish political elite is apparently planning along 
geopolitical lines that Turkey becomes an energy hub, as Einar Wigen describes it.
60
 Yet, in a 
paper prepared by the Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, the authors argue that an 
Israeli-Cypriot-Greek alliance is emerging to exploit natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean--
and thus changing the strategic balance of powers in the region.
61
 On the other hand, Mamdouh 
Salamah argues in a World Bank working paper that conflict is avoidable due to “asymmetry of 
military power between Israel and its neighbors or to membership of NATO or the European 
Union”.62 In a working paper published by an Italian think tank, Simone Tagliapietra concludes 
that Israeli exports remain “uncertain”, but that Cyprus, notwithstanding threats from Turkey, is 
likely to export natural gas through tankers.
63
 
The literature on the Levant Basin captures the different policy objective of the various 
countries involved. It also explores the potential ramifications of these discoveries. However, the 
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literature does not explore the potential for cooperation and the feasibility of regime building 
around an issue-area. Authors discussing the Levant basin have focused on internal changes to 
domestic markets resulting from the new energy finds and the new energy partnerships that can 
cause a shifting in the balance of power in the region. But they do not seek to understand how 
potential cooperation between actors could create can create regimes and how defection from 
cooperation can serves as a pretext for future conflict. This thesis will add to the literature by 
employing international liberal international regime theory and examining the existence of 
reciprocity between actors through the IPD model.  
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Chapter 2: Identifying foundational Regimes 
This research is designed to inquire about the feasibility of cooperating between Israel and 
regional powers on natural gas export strategies. For example, cooperation between Turkey and 
Israel on natural gas exports could induce Cypriot and future Lebanese discoveries to connect to 
the new infrastructure. The increased cooperation between the various countries would lead to 
greater political-military dialogue that would decrease political tension and resolve territorial 
disputes. This thesis investigates the likelihood of implicit regime formation. Building an 
interest-based multilateral regime requires compelling economic incentives to outweigh political 
uncertainties. Can economic incentives and interests outweigh the most extraordinary level of 
political conflicts? If no cooperation is achieved, mistrust and conflicts of territorial integrity can 
intensify disagreement in the region leading to a heightened level of insecurity.  
2.1 Political Economy Regimes & The Levant 
In Producing Security, Stephan Brooks suggests that regional trade agreements help facilitate 
frequent meetings and greater security integration. Brooks analyzes Latin America’s trade 
agreement, the MRCOSUR, to examine the spillover effects of economic cooperation. He finds 
that cooperation to attract economic investment led to the decline of the security rivalry between 
Brazil and Argentina.
64
 As nations seek interest-based regimes, they increase the level of 
cooperation in an issue area. These issues often require security coordination. Politico-military 
coordination results in an increase in the level of trust among partner countries. Meetings 
between various leaders increase linkages, which results in greater cooperation across multiple 
sectors. As with Latin America, historical rivalries have existed between states in the Levant. 
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Regional rivalries often occur between regional powers. Successful regimes must be brought to 
bear by deeply cooperative regional powers. Enforcing regimes on other states requires 
willingness from strong states and incentives for smaller ones.  
Regimes, specifically political economy regimes, often exist to cut transaction costs. 
Keohane suggests that regimes facilitate economically efficient cooperation. Regimes morph into 
existence after cooperative behavior.
65
 Since our case study contains many alternatives for Israeli 
exports, cooperation is more likely with the country that has the most financially efficient export 
route. Each export option must be weighed against the other options. In analyzing the IPD 
models, the other export routes signify the opportunity cost of cooperation. Other routes act as 
alternative or defection routes. But this thesis is not only concerned with natural gas exports, this 
thesis attempts to analyze the political feasibility of export routes that could result in political 
linkages.  
Regime formation must be accompanied with institutional building. In other words, a 
regime evolves around a set of expectations or a framework that awards cooperation and 
punishes defection. According to Oran Young “institutions are practices composed of recognized 
roles coupled with sets of rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of these 
roles”.66 Institutions are simply an arrangement by two or more actors. This arrangement is 
repeated over-time causing it to evolve into an expected behavior. Actors realizing the rewards 
of cooperation in anarchical community create behavioral expectations. If expectations converge 
between various actors, then it can be considered an issue-area regime. This behavior could be in 
the form of a structured organization or more loosely defined a set of expected behavior. Axelrod 
pointed out that the evolution of cooperative behavior emerges from the rational behavior of 
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reciprocity.
67
 This thesis does not predict the creation of an organization in the Levant. Instead, I 
examine the likelihood of cooperation in the Levant in the midst of a natural gas boom that could 
cause conflict on multiple levels. Cooperation predates regime formation. However, not all 
cooperation will lead to regimes. Cooperation between some states could produce a negative 
outcome for other nations (i.e. increased conflict). A regime is more than cooperation, it is 
essentially an institution that has the potential to increase peacemaking and facilitate dialogue 
among all regional parties. But a regime must start with cooperation between actors that have the 
capacity to induce regional actors to cooperate.  
This thesis presents three alternative foundational regimes. Israel and the other three 
countries in question, Greece, Turkey, and Egypt, have significant power politically and 
militarily in the Eastern Mediterranean. For a region with much political antagonism and 
conflict, Israel has a peace agreement with all three countries. The peace agreements facilitate 
institutional formation. After exploring the three regime bases, I conclude by ranking them based 
on economic efficiency, political relations, and regime formation possibility. There are two 
primary conditions to assess the feasibility of regime formation in the Levant Basin. The first 
condition is the feasibility of export potential. Does it make economic sense to export natural gas 
with this partner? The second goal is the potential of cooperation to morph into an actual regime. 
Which cooperating partner holds the political power and legitimacy to create a political regime in 
the Levant?  
2.2 Natural Gas: A regime catalyst? 
Unlike other fossil fuels, the resource of natural gas has the potential to create long-term 
cooperation. Natural gas is a form of fossil fuel that produces significantly less carbon dioxide 
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than coal and oil.
68
 It can be used to generate energy in many forms such as electricity and 
transportation.
69
 To make it more efficient for transportation and storing, natural gas is often 
liquefied; the by-product of liquefaction is referred to as LNG.
70
  The pricing of natural gas 
occurs in million British thermal unit or mmbtu. According to BP statistical data the prices of 
natural gas vary by region. In 2012, the price of natural gas in North America was 
US$2.76/mmbtu according to Henry’s Hub. In Europe, the price was US$9.46/mmbtu according 
to UK Heren NBP index. And in Asia, the price stood at US$16.75/mmbtu according to Japan’s 
LNG receiving facilities.
71
 Global pricing of natural gas is very important in understanding the 
economic nature of the investment. Investment in natural gas infrastructure requires a long-term 
horizon planning, which makes political risk consideration as vital as economic deliberation. The 
pricing of natural gas facilitates regional cooperation because of the added costs of liquefaction 
and handling. Additionally, pre-contracts with import markets are a requisite for sizable exports. 
This makes natural gas the preeminent resource for cooperation between regional producer and 
regional consumer.  
2.2.1 EU-Russia Natural Gas Regime 
The EU-Russia partnership serves as a prominent example of a natural gas regime. The 
cooperative relation have not been smooth but is an example that reflects the role of natural gas 
linking conflicting parties on interest-based cooperation. Siberian natural gas started flowing in 
Western Europe since 1968. For Russia and the Soviet bloc, natural gas served as a placeholder 
for planning the Soviet Union’s command economy.72 It was not until 2000 that the EU and 
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Russia signed a comprehensive agreement on natural gas cooperation. The EU-Russia energy 
dialogue served as the institutional backbone of the natural gas cooperation between the two 
actors. The purpose of the agreement was to create ongoing discussions to enhance 
communication between the two partners. The main goal of this communication was to facilitate 
investment opportunities for Russian and European energy firms, create fair investment laws, 
and improve EU access to Russian energy infrastructure.
73
 However, the energy dialogue has not 
been very effective. Russian-EU natural gas relations faced a number of obstacles. In 2006 and 
2009, Russia used natural gas as political instrument to bully transit and former Soviet states 
such as Ukraine. This has caused Europe to reexamine its heavy dependence on Russian natural 
gas. Additionally, these crises have caused Europe to plan new routes for energy rather than 
relying on Ukraine as a transit state.
74
 
 Russia and the EU have attempted to reignite a cooperation pattern by forming the Gas 
Advisory Council, which engages in short-term and long-term dialogue to enhance natural gas 
infrastructure and market organization.
75
 The two entities have also proposed engaging in 
cooperation on reducing carbon emissions by improving green technology.
76
 There are many 
factors that have caused the natural gas partnership between the EU and Russia to deteriorate. 
Among these reasons are nationalization of the energy sector in Russia, EU enlargement in 2004 
and 2007 into Russian sphere of influence, and increasing availability of LNG on the market.
77
 
There are also tremendous shifts in global consumption of natural gas causing higher demand for 
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Russian natural gas in Asia. But the EU and Russia have continued their interdependence on 
natural gas. The EU continues to be reliant on Russian natural gas, and Russian natural gas 
revenues are reliant on European payments.    
 The nuances of the bilateral relations have changed and transitioned but cooperation 
continues. Moscow overreached previously by using natural gas as political instrument. In 
return, Brussels sought to punish Russia by liberalizing its market and looking for alternatives. 
However, both sides realize that no other regional market can supply European energy needs and 
Russia’s gas production is best channeled to the “good” EU customer. Despite the unhealthy 
episodes, natural gas cooperation has produced the effects of a regime. The two sides hold 
summits frequently in which they coordinate on protecting infrastructure and create rules for 
bilateral investments. Natural gas is the issue-area of interest-based cooperation between two 
sides with historically conflicting relations. It has acted throughout the years as a base for 
dialogue and interactions between the political and economic sectors of both entities. It has also 
created a political and economic framework for bilateral relations and has been used to alleviate 
the suspicions between the two entities.   
2.3  Israel’s Export Options 
For Israel, options for exporting of natural gas vary considerably. Variance accounts for multiple 
factors such as cost of exploration, gas available for exports, and distance traveled for exports. 
Israel has a number of options available to it; these options not only vary in economic cost but 
also vary in political risk. As highlighted by the Washington Institute, there are three credible 
options for exporting natural gas. The first option is liquefying gas and using tankers to ship it. 
The second is to generate electricity for export. And the third option is to export through 
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pipelines. 
78
 Using one option or a combination of options will be highly dependent on export 
volumes and export destinations. According to the institute “the usual rule-of-thumb for 
choosing between a pipeline and LNG option is that LNG tankers become commercially viable 
for distances greater than 3,000 miles (4,800 kilometers). In the context of the Eastern 
Mediterranean discoveries, this suggests that future European customers would be best supplied 
by pipeline while LNG tankers would provide for Asian customers”.79 Pricing and shipping 
elements are studied closely in order to chart the best possible cooperation and its trade-offs. In 
the following section of this chapter, I will survey each option separately. 
2.3.1 Greek Route 
I will explore two separate Greek routes. Complexities of the Greek routes are both technical and 
commercial. The first route, would involve a pipeline to Athens connecting Israeli gas to the 
European grid. The pipeline would require piping at 2,000 meters of depth for more than 1,000 
km.
80
 Uncertainness about future production and the technical challenges render such investment 
inefficient. The second route would involve Cyprus. Cyprus has plans to connect Aphrodite to an 
LNG facility off its coast in the city Vasilikos. To create economies of scale, Aphrodite needs to 
be connected to Israeli fields, Leviathan and Tamar. Because of the significant infrastructure 
development the fields need to be connected for the investment to be conceivably viable. An 
LNG facility off the coast of Cyprus is estimated around US$9 to US$12 billion depending on 
the number of LNG trains; the number of trains determine the capacity of the plant. It would also 
involve a pipeline connecting the Leviathan to Aphrodite and Aphrodite to the LNG plant. The 
commercial viability of an LNG plant is uncertain at best. The high costs of such a plant without 
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guaranteed high volumes make it an unlikely option. In addition, Turkish Northern Cyprus along 
with the assistance of the Turkish Navy would react negatively.  
 Israeli exports through Greece and Cyprus are a political minefield. As the ties between 
Israel and Turkey have deteriorated, Greece, Turkey’s historical rival, has stepped to the plate. 
Since the diplomatic rupture between Israel and Turkey in 2010, Israel has conducted a yearly 
military exercise with Greece. In 2013, the naval exercise, dubbed Noble Dina, included U.S. 
forces. The joint forces flexed their naval muscles in protecting futuristic natural gas facilities off 
their respective shores.
81
 For Turkey, these naval exercises represent a shift in their perceived 
balance of power in the region. Historically Greece had a pro-Arab stance and was somewhat 
hostile to Israel. According to Vassilos Damiras at the Research Institute for European and 
American Studies, Greece was heavily reliant on Arab countries for oil and long-time Greek PM, 
Georgios Papandreou, had strong relations with the PLO leader Yasser Arafat.
82
 Israeli 
cooperation with Greece is likely to inflame tensions in the region. Turkey is especially wary of 
Israeli-Greek cooperation. While it is a feasible political alliance between the two countries, 
regionally it could spark suspicion and tension. The likelihood that an Israeli-Greek alliance will 
form into a regime is almost non-existent. In addition to triggering a Turkish-Greek-Israeli crisis, 
Greece has no lobbying powers among countries in the region. The country is economically 
weak and has almost no leverage on Levant states such as Syria, Lebanon, or the Palestinians.  
2.3.2 Turkish Route 
A pipeline project between Israel and Turkey has also been discussed. Talks have emerged 
                                                        
81
Cropsey, Seth. "Will U.S. Choose the Right Side in the Eastern Mediterranean?" RealClearWorld. July 3, 2013. Accessed August 
23, 2013. 
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/07/03/eastern_mediterranean_gas_israel_turkey_cyprus_greece_obama_erdog
an_105295.html.  
82
 Damiras, Vassilios. "Greece and Israel in an Era of Strategic Friendship and Cooperation." Research Institute of European and 
American Studies. October 8, 2011. Accessed June 8, 2013. http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/global-issues/middle-east-
studies/1604-greece-and-israel-in-an-era-of-strategic-friendship-and-cooperation.html.  
 
 
29 
between Israeli Delek Company and Turkish Zorlu Holding about constructing a pipeline at a 
cost of $2 billion.
83
 Turcas Holding, an Istanbul based company, has offered to build a pipeline 
between Turkey and Israel at cost of $2.5 billion. Turcas offered that it would bear any cost 
arising from political delays.
84
 But to be clear, without Turkish-Cypriot peace progress the 
project will not proceed. Any pipeline built from Israel to Turkey would have to go through 
Cypriot waters. Cyprus will reject such a plan and its sovereignty would be protected as a 
member of the EU. Turkish Energy minister summoned it up recently by saying “The 
commercial feasibility will only be possible after the political feasibility is established”.85 
The Turkish route is full of political obstacles. In addition to Cyprus, Israeli-Turkish 
relations have been rather cool. Until 2010, Israel and Turkey had reasonably warm relations. 
However, in 2010, Israeli commandos intercepted Turkish flotilla Mavi Marmara in an operation 
that killed several Turkish citizens. Throughout the terms of Islamist Turkish PM Tayib Erdogan 
and rightist Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu, disagreements and accusations became the new 
norm. In March 2013, American President Barack Obama convinced Netanyahu to apologize to 
Erdogan over the Marmara incident. But relations between the two governments remain tense 
and non-cordial.  
Although current political obstacles are many, the two countries had cordial relations. 
Pleasant relations have continued to exist between business establishments in both countries. 
These relationships could be very important in facilitating any form of economic agreement. 
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Also, the two countries navies are considered the best-equipped navies in the region. Naval 
capability will play a large role in offshore activities. Countries such as Lebanon or Cyprus 
cannot protect their national interests through force since their military capabilities are weak and 
their naval forces are non-existent.  
2.3.3 Egyptian Route 
Egypt, a former natural gas supplier of Israel, can reverse the direction of existing infrastructure 
that supplied Egyptian gas to Israel. From Arish-to-Ashkelon, the natural gas pipeline faces a 
myriad of security issues. Current instability in the Sinai put future supplies at risk. The route is 
also tainted by political and business corruption. Until 2012, Egypt was Israel’s largest supplier 
of natural gas for electricity production. According to officials, reasons for halting supply 
emerged from a business dispute rather than a political one. 
86
 Contrary to official statements, 
political tensions and exacerbated security risks in the Sinai played a strategic role in ending the 
agreement between the two countries. The Mubarak era deal was highly publicized in Egypt to 
be corrupt because of the substantial price accommodation offered to Israel. More recently, 
repeated bombings by militants of the pipelines increased security costs and risk premium.  
  While Egypt has large reserves of natural gas, the country’s insecurity, lack of re-
gasification infrastructure, and unabated subsidized demand have caused the country’s previous 
natural gas supply to dwindle. Israel could supply Egypt with natural gas at some form or 
another. In addition, Egypt’s liquefaction plants often operate on low capacity. Israeli natural gas 
could effectively increase the efficiency of the plants. LNG from the Damietta or Idku plant 
could be sent to both Asian and European markets. Such commercial plan is the most efficient 
because of low infrastructure cost and diverse market accessibility. But the volatile political 
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situation in Egypt and the rise of hyper-nationalism could prevent political actors from agreeing 
to an unpopular arrangement. 
2.3.4 Defection 
The last export option would be for Israel to ditch cooperation with Turkey, Greece, and Egypt. 
Firms in control of the field could build an LNG station. Since there is very little space on land, 
Israel has proposed building a floating Liquefied Natural Gas (FLNG) station. The South Korean 
Company KOGAS and Inpex have built the only FLNG station in the world; the station is being 
setup in Australia by Royal Dutch Shell.
87
 No specific dollar amount has been ascribed to the 
station but current estimates range between US$10.8 and US$12.6 bn.
88
 To make it a profitable 
endeavor, Israel would have to ship through the Suez Canal to Asian markets. While this is legal 
under the peace treaty with Egypt, the threat of inspecting Israeli ships can be unattractive for 
investors. Israel would be completely reliant on Egypt’s political turbulence and the safety of the 
Suez Canal. This option would not result in a regime. It is unlikely that simply allowing Israeli 
ships safe passage in international passage-way would allow both countries to build the 
institutional behavior of a regime.  
2.4  Conclusion 
 To assess the viability of the foundational regime bases, we have determined three factors. 
These factors are economic efficiency, political relations, and regime formation possibility. In 
terms of economic efficiency, Greece is clearly the worst route while Egypt and Turkey stand on 
solid financial footing. The Greek Cypriot route remains possible under certain conditions. 
Egypt’s route is currently not protected: if the Arish-Ashkelon line can be secured or build a new 
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undersea pipeline connecting the fields to Egypt, which would make the Egyptian route 
financially perfect. The proximity of Egypt’s LNG stations would allow Israel to ship its natural 
gas through the Suez Canal to Asian markets; energy investors would find it very lucrative and 
efficient. Turkey’s option is also very efficient. The option is relatively cheap because it requires 
a smaller investment than building an LNG terminal. It would allow Israel to send its natural gas 
to large Turkish and European markets that rely heavily on Russian gas.  
 The second factor conditioning a possible regime is current political relations. Currently, 
Israel enjoys excellent relations with Greece. The two countries have completed military 
exercises and sought to increase energy cooperation. Israeli relations with Turkey have 
deteriorated. While Israel and Turkey have a number of shared interests, the two countries 
lukewarm relations have caused many changes to their historic security cooperation. I rank Egypt 
third for various reasons. Egypt and Israel have had a peace treaty since 1979 but social, 
economic and political normalization continue to be virtually non-existent. Egypt’s current 
political climate is volatile and unpredictable. In addition, cooperation with Israel after the Arab 
Spring could be against the wishes of the revamped Egyptian electorate. These combinations 
make for an unlikely political ally in Egypt but historical energy cooperation between the two 
countries leave the door open for a possible partnership.  
The third consideration, the most essential part of our thesis, is the actual feasibility of 
building a regime; meaning the ability of bilateral cooperation to create potential linkage with 
neighboring countries. In terms of regime feasibility, Turkey and Egypt have the most promising 
potential. Cooperation with Turkey would have the effect of bringing Cyprus to the table and 
increasing the linkages in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. In Addition, greater cooperation 
between the Israeli and Turkish navies is very important for deterring confrontation and 
 
 
33 
decreasing the security dilemma between the two powers. Egypt, Israel’s first peace partner in 
the Arab world, continues to have political clout over neighboring Arab countries. Egypt can 
expand its gas commitments to Jordan by cooperating with Israel. These arrangements would 
require further political cooperation potentially causing a spillover effect.  Cooperation with 
Greece, a significant power in the Eastern Mediterranean, will cause regional tension rather than 
build linkages of cooperation. A pipeline to Athens would not offer substantial infrastructure for 
other countries in the region. For instance, it would be unwise for future Lebanese discoveries to 
connect to Athens but this is possible with Turkish discoveries. Cooperating with Cyprus without 
Turkish consent would also produce further ramifications for Greece, Cyprus and Israel. Turkey 
would look at such cooperation with suspicion.  
Thus, Israel is presented with four credible options out of the five options laid out. I will 
no longer discuss the Greek option of building a pipeline to Athens because it is not financially 
feasible. The two options that are both financially feasible and have regime potential are Turkey 
and Egypt. The first option examined in this thesis is a pipeline through Cyprus maritime 
territory to Turkey resulting in a formation of linkages and territorial settlements. The second 
option is to use existing pipeline or build an undersea pipeline to Egypt. The pipeline could also 
feed into Egypt’s LNG terminals. The third and fourth option would be to defect from either of 
these arrangements by building an LNG plant with Cyprus or in Israel.  This thesis will 
investigate the dilemma of common interests in the first and second options. Then, I suggest 
using an IPD model to envision a solution to this dilemma of common interests. 
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Chapter 3: Historical Relations 
This chapter investigates the historical bilateral relations between the two separate regime-sets. 
The chapter looks at the bilateral relations throughout modern history to understand the factors 
that lead to cooperation. My intention is not to dissect the historical bilateral relations of Turkey 
and Israel or Egypt and Israel but to identify patterns of political cooperation in an overview of 
the history of the respective relations. The environment of historical cooperation is very 
important for analyzing the feasibility of future cooperation because nations tend to have stable 
and consistent policy overtime.
89
 This consistency is the result of the geographic and historical 
nature of the state. The first section of the chapter is intended to examine Turkish-Israeli 
relations and their cooperation. The second section of this chapter examines Egyptian-Israeli 
relations and their cooperation. 
3.1 Turkish-Israeli Cooperation 
In 1949, Turkey officially became on of the few Muslim countries to recognize Israel. Since 
then, relations between the two countries have been both friendly and adversarial.  Many 
scholars point to the mid 1990s until mid 2000s as the golden age of Israeli-Turkish cooperation. 
The first security cooperation pact was signed in 1996. Subsequently, Israel supplied Turkey 
with cutting-edge military technology. Joint military exercises displayed the strong commitment 
to security cooperation between the two militaries.
90
 On the economic front, Israel and Turkey 
signed a free-trade agreement in 1996 to increase bilateral trade and tourism.
91
 According to the 
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Turkish Ministry of Economy, combined trade in 2012 has reached US$4 billion.
92
 While trade 
has continued to flourish, political relations have become strained since the mid 2000s. As we 
look at the historical changes of Turkish-Israeli relations, we recognize a distinct historical 
pattern. This pattern suggests that relations are likely to warm-up again.  
3.1.1 Turkish-Israeli Relations 
Scholars have provided two analytical concepts for understanding Israeli-Turkish 
relations. The first concept examines the multi-dimensional identity of Turkish political body. 
The second concept is grounded in geopolitical and structural analysis of Israel and Turkey. It is 
clear that Turkey’s geopolitical position has influenced the state’s identity and vice-versa. After 
World War One (WWI), Turkey viewed the Soviet Union as its historical rival and a strategic 
threat. Turkey’s nationalist architects viewed modernity as the best path for advancing Turkish 
society. Advancement and modernity were closely associated with close relations with European 
powers. However, the Turkish population did not become westernized overnight, meaning that 
Turkish people exhibited a great deal of commonalities with Muslim Arabs and shared many of 
their political and social values. Leading scholars like Hakan Yavuz and Mujeeb R. Khan point 
“to the political and ideological aims of her [turkey] leaders have imbued her foreign policy and 
indeed much of the very fabric of the country with a strong sense of duality”.93 This contradiction 
has played itself out on the Turkish-Cypriot conflict, the domestic Kurdish minority, and the 
Israeli-Turkish relationship.  
Hakan Yavuz and Mujeeb Khan break Israeli-Turkish relations into separate periods. The 
first period, 1947-1964, the authors explain that Turkish foreign policy was dominated by 
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strategic planning of becoming part of the Western sphere of power. The period from 1964-1979, 
exemplified a time of reassessment of national interests after on the Cypriot dispute, Western 
partners isolated Turkey. The third period, 1979-1988, was driven by Ankara’s weak economic 
position, especially the balance of payments crisis caused by elevated energy prices, causing a 
Turkish to pivot towards the Arab east.
94
 Yavuz and Khan argue that Israeli-Turkish relations 
respond to the changes in Turkish formulation of national interest. They also argue that national 
interests is largely defined by identity of the actors involved and democratization will lead to a 
pro-Arab policy because most Turks identify themselves more with Islam than secular European 
traditions.
95
 Hakan interprets security cooperation between Israel and Turkey in the 1990’s as a 
push back from the Kemalist military establishment against the increasing Islamization of 
Turkish elected politicians. 
96 
The second concept in Turkish foreign policy towards Israel is its geographical position. 
Turkey’s foreign policy after the end of WWII was heavily dominated by suspicions of 
Moscow’s Soviet leadership.97 To combat the Soviet threat, Turkey turned west. Israel was as an 
ally of the West, thus, Turkey recognized Israel as both a strategic ally against Soviet influences 
in the region and to enhance its relations with the West. The Soviet threat materialized in Iraq 
and Syria; which are two common foes of Israel and Turkey. After 1991, Israel felt threatened by 
Iraq under a Saddam Hussein and Syria’s under Hafez Al-Assad and his son. Threats on Turkey 
originated from the Kurdish communities living in Iraq and Syria. The two nations found mutual 
gain in military and intelligence cooperation.  
George Gruen, a geopolitical scholar, argues that Turkey’s early recognition of Israel was 
                                                        
94
 ibid 
95
 Ibid. 
96
 Yavuz, M. Hakan. "Turkish-Israeli Relations Through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate." Journal of Palestine Studies 27, 
no. 1 (Autumn 1997): 22-37. Accessed November 18, 2013. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2537807.  
97
 Bolukbasi, Suha. "Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View." Journal of Palestine Studies 29, no. 1 (Autumn 1999): 
21-35. Accessed November 13, 2013. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676428.  
 
 
37 
driven by its necessity to gain American political and commercial support. In turn, Israel also 
sought support of non-Arab states on the periphery such as Turkey, Ethiopia, and Iran.
98
 The 
geopolitical necessitates of both countries caused their relationship to overlap. Alain Gresh cites 
the importance of Syrian relations on Israeli-Turkish cooperation. Gresh argues that after the 
Cold war, Turkey did not foresee an enhancement to its relations with Syria. With the political 
cover of the Oslo accords, military cooperation and trade with Israel came with little risk and 
great reward.
99
 Turkey was also never satisfied with its relations with the Arab world. Turkish 
rapprochement with the Arab world in the 1980s quickly faded because of the decline of energy 
prices in the 1990’s and lackluster support on the Cypriot dispute.100 Turkish-Israeli cooperation 
soared during the 1990s, which lead to increasing political, commercial, and cultural ties. 
Making the relationship one of the most strategic for both countries. 
Israeli-Turkish relations have taking a dive for the worst since mid 2000. The rift in ties 
reached a pinnacle after Israeli commandos stormed Turkish freedom flotilla bound for Gaza. 
Our two concepts present two different reasons for the change. The identity concept explains, 
that the change of relationship due to the rising strength of the Islamist AKP in Turkey lead by 
PM Erdogan. The geopolitical concept explains, that the decreasing threats from Iraq, especially 
the Kurdish autonomous area, and friendly relations with Damascus are responsible for the rift. 
The two concepts can overlap especially when discussing the national interests of Turkey. The 
dominance of the Islamist parties in Turkey has produced different set of national interests 
guiding the country’s policies. But the pattern that has progressed over the years regarding Syria 
and Iraq cannot be ignored. The more threatening Turkish borders with Syria and Iraq the higher 
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likelihood of Israeli-Turkish cooperation. This can explain a great deal of Israeli-Turkish 
cooperation. This being said, identity is very important to the formation of the Turkish state, one 
cannot dismiss influential Turkish political parties and the military. Since the relationship with 
Israel has developed economically, business interest groups are likely to alter the situation, but 
the role of interest groups is to bridge the cooperation gaps are energy companies with ties to 
Israel.  
3.2  Israeli Egyptian Cooperation 
This section will survey Israeli-Egyptian historical relations and their decision-making patterns 
toward each other. Israeli-Egyptian relations have been the focal point of many investigations 
since the end of WWII. The two countries have waged battle against one-another on four major 
occasions occurring in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973. These conflicts have not only impacted the 
geopolitical map of the Middle East but they were crucial to chessboard politics in the bipolar 
world. In 1979, the two countries signed a peace treaty under guarantees by the United States 
signaling an end to major conflict. The peace between the two sides is commonly referred to as 
the “cold peace” because of the lack of normalization between the countries but the continual 
cooperation on maintaining peaceful borders. This section studies the historical relations between 
the two countries.  
3.2.1 Israeli-Egyptian Historical Relations  
Egyptian-Israeli relations must be first discussed within the framework of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. This conflict has shaped both regional and international politics. At the forefront of 
super-power politics in the region, the conflict has shaped international response to the Middle 
East and much of the Arab rhetoric regarding foreign policy. However, the significance of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict was not always a foreign policy imperative for Egyptian leaders. Egyptian 
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journalist and political historian Mohamed Heikal argues that Egypt has two foreign policy 
fronts. The first front is to the South especially relations with the Nile basin countries and the 
second is to the East with Israel and Arab countries. Heikal argues that the Southern relations are 
the most important goal for any Egyptian political leader; securing the Nile’s waters is at the 
base of life and power in the country.
101
 Between 1948 and 1952 agreements on the Nile were 
largely considered under the control of colonial superpowers. During the same period, Israel did 
not consider Egypt a serious threat to its future. The subject of Egyptian recognition of Israel was 
intensely negotiated from 1947 to 1954.
102 
 Following Nasser’s complete military takeover in 1954, Egyptian foreign affairs began to 
shift. This shift can be seen in both Nasser’s rhetoric and purchases of Soviet shipments of arms 
in response to Israel’s increasing hostility. Subsequently, Nasser’s Egypt became more 
responsive to Israeli actions after the 1956 Suez crisis. The Egyptian leader was able to exploit 
superpowers to score a moral and a strategic victory in the region. Nationalizing the Suez Canal 
brought about a new source of income and political appeal. After 1956, Egyptian foreign policy 
took a very international path. As Heikel suggests, Egyptian foreign policy looked eastward 
toward Israel and the Arab world.
103
 Egyptian-Israeli relations took an aggressive turn after the 
1956 crisis. Israel was no longer the “unwanted” new nation, but was also perceived as a military 
threat to Egypt’s interests.  
The six-day war of 1967 marked another turning point in the relations between Egypt and 
Israel. Israel was able to squash the Arab armies in a humiliating fashion. Israel captured Egypt’s 
Sinai Peninsula, destroyed its military, and dealt a blow to the morale of nationalist movements 
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in the region. After the humiliating defeat, Egypt changed its foreign policy. Egyptian leaders 
believed that they could not defeat Israel in a protracted military conflict. This assumption has 
shaped Egyptian foreign policy leading to the peace agreement and its relations with Israel until 
today. United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSC) 242 adopted certain principles to 
create peace between Arabs and Israel. These principles were the basis of subsequent Egyptian 
foreign policy. Cherif Bassiouni writes that Egypt’s foreign policy was shaped by five principles 
First, withdrawal of Israel from all Arab territories occupied after the 1967; second, recognition 
of Palestinian self-determination; third, recognition of the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO) as the sole representative of the Palestinians; fourth, recognition of Israel; and fifth; the 
conclusion of the conflict settled by all parties.
104 
These principles continued to guide Egypt’s foreign policy toward Israel. After 1967, 
Egypt was in a very weak position to negotiate any peace treaties with Israel. Many sources have 
indicated that the Egyptian leadership understood that the military balance of power was so tilted 
toward Israel that any attack would be thwarted by Israel’s dominant Air Force. 105  Thus, 
president Sadat understood fully that any advantage Egypt could deploy passed a surprise attack 
would be through political dialogue. Those plans culminated in the surprise attack of October 
1973. The initial success coupled with the oil embargo gave Egypt a new psychological 
advantage. Egypt’s new position, with the support of its allies in the region, gave it the ability to 
negotiate for peace. In the beginning of the negotiations, Sadat attempted to bring other Arab 
leaders such as King Hussein of Jordan, Yasser Arafat of the PLO and Hafez Al-Assad of Syria, 
but none would accept these invitations. The visit by Sadat to Jerusalem in 1977 caused great 
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anguish among other Arab leaders. On the one hand, Sadat made the decision that the USSR was 
not helpful militarily and economically as an ally. On the other hand, relations with the US can 
deliver the Sinai, military aid, economic aid, and the increased investment that Egypt’s economy 
needed.
106
 This culminated in the peace treaty between the two countries that endures until today. 
The peace process between Israel and Egypt is gives great insights into Egyptian foreign policy. 
After accomplishing initial success, Egypt attempted to act a regional leader. However, the dire 
consequences of inaction would have reflected negatively on the Egyptian state. Egypt pursues a 
national strategy at a time of weakness and a regional strategy at a point of strength.  
The relationship between Egypt and Israel has not normalized. Final settlement between 
Arabs and Israel continues to protract normalization. In 1983, an article discussing the 
possibilities of normalization between the two countries concluded that normalization is unlikely 
without a full settlement of the conflict.
107
 Jacob Abadi argues in the Israeli Affairs journal that 
the presence of Islamist parties, Egypt’s weak economy, and over-reliance on the United States 
are the reasons for the lack of normalization.
108
 However, the lack of normalization has not 
prevented the two nations form cooperating.  
Cooperation on natural resources has been a pillar of the Egyptian-Israeli peace relations 
since the establishment of the peace treaty.  Karim Wissa dedicated a thesis to discussing the role 
of oil in Sinai during the inter-war years, 1967-1973, and on Egyptian-Israeli peace talks. Wissa 
said that Egypt initially did not value the importance of oil in the Sinai. But after 1967, Egypt’s 
economic woes and lack of access to financial capital increased the importance of oil. Egypt’s 
economy was in dire need for foreign capital injections to alleviate further pressure on the 
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currency. Natural resources, particularly oil, were the quickest remedy.  In the meantime, Israel 
supplied nearly 80% of its oil demand from the Sinai fields during the interwar period. This 
helped the Israeli economy tremendously causing the bill of imports to go down and offered 
Israel an undisrupted supply of oil. Oil was used a confidence building measure in the peace 
negotiations. Egyptian General Petroleum Company (EGPC) owned by the Egyptian Petroleum 
Ministry contracted three fictitious companies to export Sinai oil to Israel. The ban on trade with 
Israel was lifted in 1980. The secret trade became public with Egypt directly exporting oil to 
Israeli companies at an agreed price.
109
 In 1995, Egyptian oil represented one-third of total oil 
consumed in Israel.
110
 That number has subsequently decreased due to maturing oil fields in the 
Sinai and substantial increase in Israeli demand since 1995. Oil was replaced with natural gas.  
In 2005, Egyptian and Israeli companies signed a historic agreement that provided Israel 
with 60 bcf of natural gas, about 40% of its total consumption.
111
 The deal became operational in 
2008 when the Arish-Ashkelon pipeline was completed.
112
 The amount of supplied natural gas to 
Israel increased incrementally to 74 bcf a year.
113
 However, many Egyptians had accused the 
outgoing president, Hosni Mubarak, of giving favorable prices to Israel and his associates of 
being involved in corrupt dealings. In addition to the unpopularity of the deal, militants 
repeatedly attacked the Arish-Ashkelon pipeline.  
In April 2012, Egypt officially cancelled the gas deal with Tel Aviv. Government and 
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company officials describe the cancellation as a business disagreement but many had described 
the situation as deteriorating political ties.
114
 It was most likely a combination of the business and 
politics. Egypt natural gas consumption has been booming while reserves stagnate. According to 
BP Statistical Review, Egypt’s proved reserve increased by 5% from 2004-2012. At the same 
time domestic consumption increased by 65%. Production kept up with demand but the 
stagnation of reserves meant that supplies for exports had to decrease.
115
 Egyptian natural gas 
exports have declined in half from 496 bcf in 2008 to 237 bcf in 2012.
116
 Egyptian LNG plants 
have become inefficient because of the increasing domestic consumption and stagnant reserves 
leading to lower exports. Such business interests are an important factor, however, they pale in 
comparison to geopolitics and the increasingly important internal politics. Furthermore, business 
interests in Egypt are seen as part of the state apparatus especially in the energy sector.  
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Chapter 4:Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Since there is no enforcement of law in the international system, states seek optimal partnerships 
with one-another. These partnerships are often “arise from self-interested parties endeavoring to 
coordinate their behavior to reap gains”.117 Keohane and Nye describe regimes not only as a one-
time agreement but also as a set of agreements. Similarly, Axelrod’s IPD game theory models 
indicate that actors will evolve to cooperate if they see themselves playing the same game more 
than once.
118
 Similar to the World Trade Organization or American-Canadian relations’ post-
WWII, regimes exhibit a set of implicit or explicit rules to coordinate activities. Anarchy in the 
international system presents states with the dilemma of common interest. Cooperation in the 
international system creates internal and external risks for the political actors. Defection is the 
safest strategy in the dilemma of common interests. To cooperate, the internal and external 
environments of the states must make them aware of the benefits not only of initial cooperation 
but also of long-term payoffs of the implicitly or explicitly-formed set of rules. For example, the 
ECSC was a foundational regime base for the European Community. Successful bargaining by 
regional powers created the rules of ECSC. The political environment of a post-WWII Europe 
was conducive to regime building. The process of regime building after initial cooperation relies 
on the need for other states to engage in efficient cooperation and the capacity of foundational 
members to accommodate those interests. Analyzing the current dynamics and objectives of 
these states, in addition to their internal and external political environment helps us capture the 
inclination to cooperate or defect in the initial steps of forming a regime.  
In chapters two and three, I discussed the economic variables and the historical 
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conditions that existed to allow these states to cooperate. In this chapter, I lay out further 
economic data, discuss the current political relationship of these countries, and it will also tackle 
the internal environment that is critical to decision-making. The two fundamental questions that I 
address are 1) what is the probability of Israeli-Turkish cooperation? 2) What is the probability 
of Israeli-Egyptian cooperation?  
 The first section elaborates on Israeli objectives. I examine the cost and benefits that 
Israel could gain from these natural resources, the geopolitical value of those benefits, and 
Israel’s policy toward the development of the resources. Turkey and Egypt have different various 
reasons for cooperating and defecting. These states suffer the classic dilemma of common 
interests. By analyzing Egypt and Turkey’s current state of affairs we can deduce if the political 
climate that is feasible for cooperation. These incentives shape the possibilities of orchestrating 
an initial agreement that can continue to morph into a set of arrangements. Then, the IPD will 
express the financial and political investment by both sides. Additionally, I talk about the impact 
of external powers and how they could influence defection or cooperation.   
4.1 Israeli Objectives  
Israeli natural gas discoveries have significant potential for increasing Israeli strategic depth in 
the region. On the one hand, Israel will take valuable steps towards reducing energy dependence, 
enhance its economic outlook, and have the potential to create and enhance strategic 
relationships with export destinations. On the other hand, the discoveries could potentially 
provide a menacing security threat and geopolitical volatility. Maritime territorial integrity has 
already caused heightened tension between Israel and Lebanon. In addition, Israel’s shifting 
alliances has already rattled Turkey. Discoveries of offshore natural gas could increase naval 
deployments, which increase the possibilities of miscalculation in the Mediterranean.  
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 Israel has a developed economy with no natural resources--a feat that is quite rare in the 
region. According to Gawdat Bahgat, “[Israel's] decades-long efforts to discover oil at a 
commercial level have not succeeded”.119 In 2011, Israel relied on imports for 18.84 Million 
Tonnes of Oil Equivalent (Mtoe) out of 23.25 Mtoe consumed; more than 80% of its energy 
needs.
120
 Israel has made substantial progress on renewable energy production capacity and 
production of natural gas, but nearly all of its coal and crude oil is imported.
121
 Between 2008 
and 2012, Egypt supplied the bulk of Israel’s natural gas. However, Israeli natural gas 
discoveries in the past decade are reshaping its energy sector.  From 2010 to 2011, Israeli natural 
gas production increased from 54.74 bcf to 91.82 bcf.
122
 Since coming online in April 2013, 
Tamar has produced an average of 636 million cubic feet (mcf) daily.
123
 With Tamar’s current 
production capacity, Israel now produces nearly 250 bcf of natural gas annually, freeing it from 
reliance on foreign sources.  
To further utilize these discoveries, Tel Aviv is increasing the use of natural gas in energy 
production. While it mostly serves as fuel for electricity, Israel will attempt to widen the uses of 
natural gas and further decrease its reliance on international markets and vulnerability to price 
fluctuations. Natural gas will also have strong net positive effects on the economy. According to 
the Bank of Israel, gas discoveries are expected to contribute nearly one full percentage to Israel 
GDP in 2013. These supplies will also help alleviate Israel’s resource import bill by nearly $3 
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billion in 2013.
124
 With potentially major gas exports in the future, Israel’s net financial benefit 
from natural gas will only increase.  
Theses resources present a number of uncertainties. Their exploration has already caused 
increased regional tension. This tension originated from maritime border disputes between Israel 
and Lebanon. Lebanon claims that Israel is siphoning off its resources and that part of the Tamar 
and Leviathan fields are located in Lebanon’s EEZ.125 While the Lebanese do not present a 
significant naval threat to Israel, Hezbollah’s militia wing does threaten Mediterranean natural 
gas infrastructure. Hezbollah-controlled Iranian missiles, such as zalazel-2, have the capacity of 
reaching Israel’s offshore fields. These threats prompted the Israeli military to ask for 3 billion 
Israeli shekels (equivalent to US$860 million) to be set aside for purchasing the naval equipment 
required to protect offshore rigs.
126
  
Israel’s early cooperation with Cyprus-- against the wishes of Ankara-- has also increased 
geopolitical tension. Since Israel’s attack on the Gaza-bound Turkish flotilla in 2010, the Turkish 
navy has exponentially increased its naval operations in the Mediterranean. The Turkish navy 
possesses the largest fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean with approximately 200 ships.
127
 This 
escalation of activities on the high seas will increase the potential for signal miscalculation and 
increase the opportunities for hostilities to erupt. The region’s chaotic breakdown since 2011 has 
also produced uncertainty-- particularly in Syria. The outcome of the Syrian civil war could, 
potentially, produce a regime with better ties to Ankara. If Israel chooses to pursue a natural gas 
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exportation partnership with Cyprus or Greece, the region could see an alarming realignment of 
power. Such a change could produce uncertain outcomes. Theses include increased hostilities 
from Turkey towards Cyprus and deepen mistrust and tension between Arab states and Israel.  
Israel can use this opportunity to increase cooperation in the region, rather than widen the 
power gaps or tension between old rivalries. Regional leaders are well aware of this tension. But 
this awareness does not signify a readiness to compromise. Israeli priorities are fairly clear. In 
determining export destinations, Israel has allowed firms to be in semi-control of the process.
128
 
But in March 2013, Israeli Minister of Energy and Water Uzi Landau warned that companies 
cannot sign export contracts without the final approval of the government.
129
 The Israeli 
administration wants to stay clear of political waters as much as possible by showing that the 
process is purely financial, but Tel Aviv understands that any decision will be political. Any 
export strategy must be compatible with Israel’s security policy. In an energy conference in 
September of 2013, Israel’s energy envoy said that Israel favors having more than one export 
option. The envoy also stressed that Israel would like to work with both Cyprus and Turkey.
130
 In 
the Tzmach report, Israel stated preference for having an LNG station in its maritime territory-- 
and not in Cyprus, as initially proposed.
131
 In October 2013, the Minister of Energy and Water 
said that Israel is holding talks with Egypt on exporting natural gas,
132
 but the Chairman of the 
Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company (EGAS) quickly denied the rumor. According to a 
report from Reuters, the Egyptian official said that Egypt is not interested in purchasing gas from 
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Israel via a pipeline; he said that Egypt would rather developed its capacity to import LNG.
133  
Israel is intent on diversifying its export options. This is not only economically smart but it is 
also a wise move geopolitically. Israel does not want to be over-reliant on Turkey as its gateway 
to the European market and it also wants to avoid any complications provided by Cypriot-
Turkish antagonism.  
Regarding its territorial conflict with Lebanon, Israel has pursued a two-faced policy. On 
the one hand, accepting the United States as a mediator between the two countries. In November, 
Lebanese Energy minister said, “there is progress on the subject” however, he mentioned that 
this progress is only in viewpoints of both sides.
134
 On the other hand, there seems to be very 
little change. Israel has continued to operate on the basis of its own demarcations, and 
development of Tamar and Leviathan has seen no change. Israel believes that it has very little to 
worry about from the Lebanese front. The Lebanese military does not have the capability to 
engage Israel on the high seas and Hezbollah is in a quagmire in the Syrian civil war. Since its 
early engagement in the Syrian civil war, Hezbollah has lost a great deal of popularity in many 
Lebanese and Arab circles and its military capabilities are busy defending the Assad regime.  
Israel’s early calculation can be seen as an attempt to create unintended geopolitical 
chaos. The years that produced the largest discoveries of natural gas reserves coincided with the 
years during which Israeli-Turkish relations were deteriorating. Israel sought to balance Turkey 
with Greece and Cyprus. However, Greece is not a substitute for Turkey. Israeli envoys to 
energy conferences began displaying a shift in early 2013 shortly after Netanyahu’s apology to 
Turkish PM Erdogan. Currently, Israel seems to be exploring every option for exporting its 
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natural gas, developing its fields, and maintaining the regional distribution of power. Israel does 
not want to evoke more geopolitical changes than those already being caused by the so-called 
“Arab Spring”.  
4.2 Israel’s and Turkey’s Dilemma of Common Interest 
Turkey’s relations with Israel have historically been mostly cordial. The two countries have 
found cooperation effective. However, many facets of Turkish society are uncomfortable with 
Israel as partner. Turkey’s multidimensional identity and its changing foreign policy goals are 
key to the environment surrounding bilateral relations and future cooperation. Ankara’s foreign 
policy is striking an independent tone and has attempted to play an active role on regional issues. 
Additionally, the reputation of Turkey’s emerging economy and its business-driven political 
parties make the possibilities for cooperation stronger. Turkey also has a stake in exploiting the 
region’s energy resources for the Turkish community in Cyprus. The Turkish-Cypriot dispute 
represents the greatest regional threat to exploit its natural resources. Israel’s stated policy 
objective is to avoid the territorial disputes between Nicosia and Ankara. For cooperation to 
occur, Turkey must compromise on Cyprus in return for Israeli investments and natural gas. But 
Turkey cannot be sure that Israel will reciprocate. Israel has other options, one of which is to 
partner with Cyprus on an LNG terminal. For Israel, cooperation with Turkey is not the most 
lucrative option but it remains an excellent option for investors. However, Israel political leaders 
will be heavily reliant on Turkey as transit state. A situation that gives Turkey the opportunity to 
use natural gas as a political tool.  
4.2.1 Strategic depth 
Turkey’s heavy reliance on energy imports makes Israel’s natural gas an appealing opportunity 
for diversification. In 2011, Turkey imported via pipeline 56% of its consumed natural gas from 
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Russia and 19% from Iran. The rest of its imports came from Nigerian and Algerian LNG 
contracts.
135
 Turkey’s dependence on Russia-- its historic rival--makes Israel’s natural gas a wise 
geopolitical and economic alternative. In 2012, Turkey consumed 1.64 tcf, and was completely 
dependent on foreign imports.
136
 Israel’s exports can compete with Russian exports by driving 
down prices and giving Turkey greater diversity and replacing expensive LNG imports. A 
natural gas pipeline could add to Turkish “strategic depth” in the region. Strategic depth often 
refers to Turkey’s policy-makers emphasis on utilizing the country’s geopolitical position to 
enhance its regional power.  
Gareth Winrow identifies two strategic imperatives for Turkish energy strategy. The first 
priority is to secure energy supplies for growing domestic consumption. The second is to become 
a strategic transit state for energy and a regional energy hub. 
137
 Turkey is leveraging its 
geography to further its strategic political ambitions. Located between the Caucasus, Russia, 
Middle East and Europe, Turkey geographical situation has made it a strategic player, rather than 
merely a heavy importer. There are two significant economic benefits for a transit state. First, the 
transit state earns significant fees from energy transfer. And, second, part of the fuels in the 
pipelines is often sold to the transit state at a reduced price. This is very significant for an 
energy-dependent country like Turkey; fuel imports accounted for past balance of payments 
crises. There are also a number of secondary effects, such as job creation, increases economic 
activity, and security of energy flows into the domestic market.  
Turkey’s ambition to build a complex pipeline matrix is slowly materializing. The port of 
Ceyhan represents one of the world’s most strategic energy ports. Ceyhan is the terminal for two 
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major pipelines. In 2006, the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan, which carries approximately 1.2 million bpd 
of Azeri and Kazakh oil, came into service. The other major pipeline is the Kirkuk-Ceyhan 
pipeline, which has an operational capacity of 1.65 million bpd but operates at only 600,000 
bpd.
138
 In 2008, the EU initiated “An EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan”, which 
called for energy consumption diversification by EU member states and created an action plan 
for future investment in energy infrastructure. The EU commission also proposed the Southern 
Gas Corridor, which connects the EU to Middle Eastern and Caspian gas fields, with Turkey 
playing a major role.
139
 Turkey’s interconnector with Greece is already carrying substantial 
amounts of Azeri natural gas towards Europe. In 2014, construction is due to begin on the Trans-
Anatolia pipeline (TANAP). The pipeline will carry Azeri gas to Turkey via Georgia and will 
eventually connect to the Trans-Adriatic pipeline linking Greece, Turkey, and Italy.
140
 Turkish 
policymakers concerned about the country’s “strategic depth” relish the opportunity to make the 
new Eastern Mediterranean fields a part of the country’s diverse web.  
4.2.2 Identity and foreign policy 
Some Turkish policymakers, especially PM Erdogan, have made a domestic and international 
reputation by antagonizing Israel. Israeli actions in the region, especially in the Palestinian 
territories, have increasingly damaged Israel’s international reputation. Many analysts suggest 
that Turkey’s new policies favor the East and damaged their relations with the West. The foreign 
policy vision of Neo-Ottomanism has rekindled the idea of a hegemonic Islamist Turkey. 
Omer Taspinar explained in The Washington Quarterly that there are three “grand 
strategic visions” driving Turkish foreign policy: Kemalism, Neo Ottomanism, and Gaullism. 
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The author explains, in today’s Turkey Kemalism is represented by the secular People’s 
Republican Party (CHP); Neo-Ottomanism by the religiously ideological AKP; and Gaullism by 
a mixture of both. Taspinar argues that Neo-Ottomanism advocates a foreign policy that 
prioritizes the importance of Turkish identity, history and geographic position. Neo-Ottomanist 
do not seek hegemony but they pursue an active policy, especially in the former territories of the 
Ottoman Empire, seeking political opportunities to improve the economic standing of Turkey. 
The author argues that Erdogan’s approach to Syria follows this path of re-engaging former 
Ottoman territories--in order to benefit the economic welfare of Turkey. But policies pursued by 
AKP continue to focus upon Turkish borders and national identity rather than a religious or an 
ideological identity. 
141
 AKP’s policy of reaching out to the Middle East was fairly successful 
economically. Turkey’s trade with the Middle East increased from US$3.9 bn in 2002 to 
US$23.6 bn in 2010. Not only did trade grow, but also as portion of the Turkish economy, trade 
more than doubled from 6% in 2002 to 16% in 2010.
142
 After the Arab Spring, Turkish policy 
took on an ideological edge. Erdogan’s unrelenting support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 
and reports of Turkish authorities favoring Islamists fighters in the Syrian civil war sheds light 
on the ideological remnants of AKP policymakers. This does not mean that a partnership with 
Israel is inconceivable but a religiously ideological AKP may deviate away from a strategic 
economic cooperation with Israel.  
The ideological character of political actors in Turkey remains an important factor in the 
decision making process. AKP is less likely to cooperate with Israel than CHP, however, its 
history suggests that it almost always favors economic partnership over political theatrics. A 
closer examination of historical relations between Israel and Turkey reveals that identity is not 
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the only important factor. Turkey’s policy towards Israel is impacted by its perception of the 
geopolitical threat environment around its borders, especially those arising from Syria and Iraq. 
4.2.3 Syria and Iraq on Turkish foreign policy 
Turkish and Syrian mutual threat perception has guided their bilateral relations. Turkey has often 
used its strategic alliance with Israel as counterweight to the strategic threat posed by Syria. 
Moran Stern and Dennis Ross argue, “developments in or associated with Syria have proved 
instrumental in determining Israeli-Turkish relations, for better or for worse”.143 A range of 
threats has emerged in Syrian-Turkish relations since 1946. Syria claims the province of Hatay, 
annexed by Turkey in 1938, as part of its own territory.
144
 Syria’s support for the Kurdish 
Workers Party (PKK) has also played a tremendous role in the Turkish-Syrian relations. Syria 
funded and assisted the PKK to create constant pressure on Turkey. But in 1999, after the capture 
of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and threats of invasion by Turkish, in response, Syria, 
abandoned the PKK and list it as a terrorist group. The bilateral relations improved steadily.  
Hydro politics were an instrumental component of Turkish-Syrian reengagement. Robert 
Olson argues that the Turkish-Syrian relations are mostly focused on Kurds and water. He 
further argues that Syria used the Kurds to pressure Turkey on water issues, particularly water 
allocation, and Turkey used water allocation to pressure Syria to crackdown on the PKK.
145
 The 
decline for Syrian support for Kurdish nationalists at the end of the 1990’s, the advent of Turkish 
foreign policy of the early 2000’s, and peace negotiations with the PKK helped transform the 
Syrian-Turkish relationship. In 2008, Turkey enjoyed good relations with Damascus. Putting its 
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good relations to test, Turkey, attempted to broker peace talks between the Israelis and Syrians 
but the talks collapsed after Israel began its raid on Gaza.
146
 The deterioration in Turkey’s 
relationship with Tel Aviv catalyzed the rise of Ankara’s relations with Damascus. In 2009, at a 
gathering of the Syrian-Turkey business council, Erdogan emphasized cooperation with Syria 
and his willingness to further cooperation saying “not only are we abolishing visas, we will 
remove other obstacles, too. We will append our signature on partnerships which could be a 
model for the world. We have this potential”. Earlier that year, the two countries signed strategic 
cooperation agreement whereby high-level officials of both countries would be meeting 
frequently.
147
 Additionally, the two countries signed a pact that allows cooperation between the 
defense industries.
148
 The two militaries conducted a symbolic three-day border drill, which 
received significant attention from Israel.
149 
Prior to the breakout of the Syrian civil war, Turkish-Syrian relations reached 
unprecedented cooperation. Syria’s unexpected civil uprising, the government harsh crackdown 
followed by the commencement of the civil war has changed the paradigm of the relationship 
between Syria and Turkey. In August 2011, nearly five months after the commencement of the 
uprising in Syria, Turkey’s FM Ahmet Davutoglu issued a warning to the Assad regime to stop 
the crackdown “immediately and unconditionally” on Syrian civilians. 150  The relationship 
declined quickly. First, Turkey called for dialogue between parties then advocated the overthrow 
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of the Syrian regime. In January 2012, Syrian forces fired at two Turkish jets. Subsequently, 
Turkey increased pressure against the Assad regime warning that it could take further steps to 
protect itself against “hostile action”.151 Official United Nations (UN) documents confirmed the 
transfer of 47 tons of weapons in 2013 across the Turkish border to Syria; however, Turkish 
foreign ministry said that the weapons were for “non-military use”. 152  Reports have also 
suggested that Turkey has supported a number of Islamist groups, including Al-Qaeda affiliated 
groups, in an effort to target Kurdish fighters in Syria.
153
 The increase in hostilities on the Syrian 
border prompted closer coordination with Israel. Shortly after Israel’s apology to Turkey, Turkey 
purchased Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).
154
 Purchasing sophisticated 
military technology has been the highlight of Turkish-Israeli relations during the era of 
cooperation. The situation in Syria presents a wide range of threats to Turkey. These threats 
include Kurdish autonomy, border violence, and the possible victory of Bashar Al Assad. This 
increases the likelihood for cooperation between Turkey and Israel. In addition, to Turkey’s need 
for high-tech weapons and surveillance system as well as shared interest to contain the violence 
in Syria. 
The relationship between Turkey and Iraq follows a similar pattern to the Turkish-Syrian 
relations. Turkish-Iraqi relations exhibit the same characteristics and effect on Israel as the 
Turkish-Syrian relations. Its relations with Iraq have historically focused on the security threats 
from Iraq’s Kurdish population. Threats emerging from Kurdish communities drove Turkey’s 
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policies toward the West, especially Israel in the 1990s. Turkey’s East Anatolian Project or GAP, 
a series of dams on the Tigris and Euphrates, continues to stir complications with Iraq.
155
 But 
scholars such as Henri Barkey describe the historical relationship between Baghdad and Ankara 
by stating, “beyond Cold War concerns, Turkey’s interest in Iraq was limited to the potential 
threat of a Kurdish ethnic awakening”.156 Another scholar, Marvin Howe, explains “against this 
background of continued tension with their neighbors, a group of Turkish military commanders 
flew to Israel in February 1996 and signed a far-reaching Military Cooperation and Training 
Pact”.157 Since the mid 1980’s until most recently, the Kurdish threat drove a wedge between 
Turkish and a Middle East rapprochement and in the process making Israel the most natural ally.  
Barkey concludes that three major wars in Iraq since 1980 played a major role in 
crystallizing the Kurdish threat for Turkey. The Iraq-Iran conflict from 1980-1988 coincided 
with the Kurdish rebellion in Turkey. Kurdish refugees from Iraq further complicated the 
security threat to Turkey. The U.S. led defeat of Saddam Hussein in 1991 augmented the number 
Kurdish refugees and lead to the creation of Kurdish autonomous region. Iraqi Kurdistan became 
a “rear base of operations” for the PKK. In 2003, The United States led invasion of Iraq 
advanced the autonomy of northern Kurdish areas. A year later, the PKK started carrying out 
operations against Turkey from Kurdistan Iraq.
158 
But with the advent of new Turkish foreign 
policy, Turkish leaders pursued a strategy of co-opting the Kurds in Iraq.  
Recognizing the political vacuum in Iraq, Turkey sought to take advantage and play an 
integral role in Iraq’s politics. On the other hand, The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 
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has been planning its economic independence from Baghdad. With only two borders, Iran and 
Turkey, the KRG calculated that reconciliation with Ankara is a necessity. There has been a 
remarkable change is Turkey’s national interest since the beginning of the 2003 Iraq war. In a 
2005 report, Henri Barkey outlines Turkey’s dual interests in Iraq: the first is denying a safe 
heaven for PKK to carry out operations against its military personnel and, the second, is to 
“minimize” the politicization of the Kurdish community in Iraq. Turkey’s historical preference is 
to maintain a powerful central government in Iraq to insure its objectives.
159
 A 2012 report, 
released by the Washington Institute, titled “Iraqi Kurds draw closer to Ankara while Baghdad 
seems to drift further away”.160 In just seven years, Turkey went from attacking PKK positions in 
northern Iraq to burgeoning trade valued at nearly US$8 billion in 2012.
161
 There are multiple 
reasons for the turnaround. Peaceful negotiations between the PKK and Ankara, Turkey’s need 
for energy supplies, export oriented industrial base of the AKP, and the KRG’s ambitions of self-
reliance just to name a few. Turkey’s relations with Iraq’s central government have been less 
stellar. In 2012, Turkey’s ambassador to Iraq was summoned for meddling in “domestic affairs”. 
Iraqi PM Nouri Al Maliki said “Turkey interferes by backing certain political figures and blocs” 
continuing to warn that “Turkey is unqualified to intervene in the region's flash points”.162 
Ankara has been increasingly vocal about the Shiite-Sunni rift in Iraq and elsewhere in the 
region. Shiite Nour Maliki sees Turkey as a backer of Sunni influential blocs in Iraq. On the 
other end, the situation with Iraq’s Kurds continues to improve after the signings of energy 
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agreements. The KRG allowed for the transport of oil to Turkey against Baghdad’s wishes. 
Highlighting the better relations and the historical turn around, KRG leader Massoud Barzani 
made a special visit to Ankara as a guest of PM Erdogan.
163
 The peace talks with the PKK 
remain one of the most elusive and important issues regarding Turkish-Kurdish relations. If the 
peace talks between the PKK and Ankara do not lead to a settlement, we could witness a 
rehashing of Kurdish nationalism, which could become more dangerous for Turkey.  
In conclusion, the Kurdish conflict, taking place in Iraq and Syria, has been very 
influential on the bilateral relations between Turkey and Israel. This is more apparent after 
the end of the cold war because the historic rivalry with Russia no longer threatens Turkish 
sovereignty.  The peace negotiations with the PKK are very important to the environment 
of Israeli-Turkish relations. If the peace talks fail, chances for greater cooperation between 
Israel and Turkey will increase. On the other hand, peace with Kurds could mean greater 
conflict between Turkey and its regional border. In either event, Turkish-Israeli relations 
will most likely improve. Syria’s unending civil war will continue to revive the Israeli-
Turkish partnership leading to more avenues of cooperation.  
4.2.4 Economics and Business Interest 
At the heart of Turkey’s new economy is an export-based industry. Many contend that this 
industry makes the backbone of the ruling party. While business interest are not very significant 
between the two countries, Turkish energy firms could have a role in bridging the gap between 
Israel and Turkey. The Israel-Turkey business council, aimed at fostering business relations 
between companies of the two countries, has more than 100 member companies.
164
  The council 
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has facilitated trade relations, which has continued to skyrocket despite the political tension. 
Trade between the two countries has increased by 35% since the Mvi Marmara incident off the 
cost of the Gaza strip.
165
 Although such data should be treated with caution, but there seems to 
be very little correlation between the two countries trading habits and political relations.  
Zorlu Holdings, a Turkish conglomerate investing in Israel, is in talks with the various 
owners of the gas fields to export natural gas through Turkey. Chief executive of Zorlu said, 
“Turkey is a very suitable route for Israeli gas. I can even say it is the most suitable”. Zorlu 
energy, an arm of Zorlu holdings, owns 25% of Dorad Energy, which is building an 875-
megawatt (MW) power plant in the coastal city of Ashkelon. The project proposed would entail 
building an undersea pipeline from the fields to Turkey’s southern border.166  
4.2.5 Geopolitics of the Pipeline 
Geopolitics would continue to complicate 
cooperation plans between the two countries. 
Figure 2, shows claimed maritime territory of each 
country on the Levant Basin.  The major challenge 
to any pipeline is the lack of recognition between 
countries. A pipeline between Israel and Turkey 
would be required to pass through Cyprus’s EEZ. A 
pipeline through Cyprus involves settling or making progress towards the Cypriot-Turkish 
dispute. While this thesis is not dedicated to discussing the Turkish-Cypriot conflict, it is 
essential to discuss its ramification on Turkish-Israeli cooperation.  
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The 1974 coup d’état carried out by the Greek Cypriot military junta and the subsequent 
response of Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus, created the current conditions of a divided 
Cyprus. The green line that divided Nicosia, the country’s capital, is now the border between the 
two countries. After fruitless negotiations the Turkish community unilaterally declared their 
independence in 1983. Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is only recognized by one country, 
Turkey, which also acts as the guarantor of the country’s security. The global community has 
continued to recognize the Greek Cypriot government as the only legitimate government on the 
island. Settlement of the Turkish-Cypriot dispute has taken a higher level of importance since 
Cyprus accession into the EU. Since then, a number of negotiations have been held to reach a 
compromise between the two parties. In 2004, a reunification plan was put to referendum. The 
plan was accepted by the Turkish community but refused by the Greek.
167
 Natural gas found on 
the coast of Cyprus has an important effect on the peace talks between the two communities. The 
finding could lead the Turkish party to accept greater compromise for economic benefit or it 
could lead to a hawkish Turkey inflaming the region with greater tension. Turkish FM recently 
said “there is a new window of opportunity for peace” adding that “any postponement of the 
resolution would only add more tension”. 168 Negotiations on the Cyprus dispute are ongoing. 
These negotiations are among the many games involving regional actor vying for the riches in 
the Levant. 
4.3 Israel’s and Egypt’s Dilemma of Common Interest 
Since the beginning of 2011, Egypt’s political fortunes have dramatically changed. The 
emergence of “hydro-politics” of the Nile has caused Egypt to look South rather than East for 
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most of the last two years. However, Egypt played peacemaker between Palestinian faction 
Hamas and Israel on its eastern front. More recently, Egypt’s own internal strife, specifically the 
military’s campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood, has occupied Egyptian politics internally 
and externally. The political leadership in Egypt faces a dilemma when it comes to cooperation 
with Israel. On the one hand, cooperation with Israel could produce strong economic incentives 
for Egypt such as fees for natural gas transports, access to inexpensive natural gas for domestic 
markets, and increase economic activity in the natural gas sector. On the other hand, cooperation 
with Tel Aviv risks political anger from newly mobilized domestic constituents. For Egyptian 
political leadership to sell cooperation, progress must be made on the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Natural gas exports through Egypt represent the most efficient option for investors in Israel. But 
for Israel government, the risks would be to entrust its natural gas exports to a weak state in 
Egypt that has already reneged on a previous contract. Additionally, progress on the Arab-Israeli 
issue could be viewed with great risk by Israeli leadership.  
4.3.1 South And East: Egypt’s geopolitics 
In the past three years, Egypt has changed four different leaders (Mubarak, Military, 
Morsi, Mansour). Their periods of weak leadership focused on traditional Egyptian foreign 
policy, specifically the Nile. Nearly every major population center in Egypt is concentrated on or 
near the Nile. The Nile is the single most important policy issue in regards to the security and 
prosperity of Egypt. Securing allocation to the Nile waters is the most significant national 
security priority for Cairo. The basin of the Nile includes Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Egypt.
169
 
The countries of the Basin, especially the upstream countries, continue to pose threats to Cairo’s 
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water supply. Focusing on the Nile has historically shifted attention away from other issues, 
leaving Egyptian leaders will political capital to pursue other international ventures. 
 In 1959, Egypt and Sudan signed a water sharing treaty but Ethiopia has declared that it 
will not honor it.
170
 Not long after concluding the treaty, Egyptian President Nasser ordered the 
building of the Aswan High Dam against the objections of the upstream countries. Egypt 
maintained that it would not compromise on issues of water. Egypt often threatened military 
action against its weaker neighbors. In 1979, shortly after the peace agreement between Israel 
and Egypt, Egyptian president Anwar El Sadat declared, “Any action that would endanger the 
waters of the Blue Nile will be faced with a firm reaction on the part of Egypt, even if that action 
should lead to war. As the Nile waters issue is one of life and death for my people, I feel I must 
urge the United States to speed up the delivery of the promised military aid so that Egypt might 
not be caught napping”.171 Shortly after Sadat’s warning to Ethiopia he went to Haifa and stated 
“I am planning to bring the sweet Nile waters—this is the sweetest of the four big rivers of the 
whole world—to the Sinai. Well, why not send you some of this sweet water to the Negev Desert 
as good neighbors?” 172 The threats to the upstream countries followed by a geopolitical olive 
branch to the new peace partner are an example of the geopolitical positioning of Egyptian 
foreign policy. It also displays the greater importance of Egypt’s Southern front in comparison to 
the Eastern front.  
In 1999, the Nile Basin countries created the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) to construct a 
framework for cooperation. But divisions continued to hamper the operations of NBI. In May 
2010, a selected group of upstream countries led by Ethiopia met to sign a cooperation 
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agreement on the reallocation of water resources.
173
 Cairo and Khartoum were both absent and 
rejected such agreement.  After the agreement, Ethiopia announced that it would construct the 
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the waters of the Blue Nile, which provide nearly 85% of 
water flow to Egypt. According to internal emails leaked from geopolitical consultancy firm, 
Stratfor, Egypt and Sudan discussed taking military action against Ethiopia.
174
 The emerging 
Ethiopian project is amongst Egypt’s top national security issues until today.  
Since the ouster of Mubarak, the Ethiopian issue has emerged at the forefront of Egyptian 
foreign policy. Shortly after becoming President, Mohamed Morsi took a two day trip to Ethiopia 
to signal a reopening of Egypt to Africa calling for a common market and collective 
development”. 175  The visit was initially a positive step, however, Egypt could not sustain 
diplomatic pressure. Egypt’s internal problems played a role by causing attention to be diverted 
away. In a televised meeting, Morsi and various national figures discussed plans to deal with 
Ethiopia’s project. Several leaders called for sabotage or attacks against the Ethiopian dam.176 
Not knowing that TV cameras were recording live, the meeting embarrassed Egypt’s political 
leaders in front of an international audience. This is evidence of the inability of Cairo to plan its 
foreign policy in the last three years. Shortly before his ouster, Morsi repeated that all options 
were on the table in dealing with the Dam project.
177
 Questions of loyalty between civil-military 
relations hampered the ability of the president to carry out proper policies. In addition, Egyptian 
politicians have not adapted very well to political grandstanding while formulating effective 
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policy.  
Morsi’s policies to the South of Cairo were in tradition with the past years. On the other 
hand, he altered the strategic dimension of foreign policy to the East. The Morsi administration 
lifted the isolation of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood faction, Hamas, in the Gaza strip. 
Morsi’s political party came to power promising a more aggressive policy towards Israel but the 
realities of governing made Morsi the ultimate peacemaker between Hamas and Israel. Morsi’s 
weakness at home contributed his administration inability to take a stand towards Israel. Egypt’s 
domestic weakness furthered its inability to carry out foreign policy decisions. In the state of 
emergency that followed the ouster of President Morsi, foreign policy was delegated to former 
Egyptian ambassador to the United States Nabil Fahmy.  
In 2012, FM Fahmy published an article in the Cairo Review about the scope and future 
of Egypt’s foreign policy. In formulating a policy about the Nile basin countries, Fahmy said, 
“Their interest [upstream countries] in dam construction is, at this point, purely economic. Thus, 
Egypt must stress the importance of this issue to its most basic national interest and assert its 
historical right to a vital resource. However, it should do so in a fashion that underlines collective 
interest-based policies with the Nile Basin states and shuns belligerent rhetoric of the sort 
exchanged between Mubarak’s regime and the Ethiopian government. The process might include 
the strengthening of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, as well as cooperating on 
development projects, in exchange for the assured flow of water to Egypt’s ever-growing 
population”.178 Since becoming foreign minister, Fahmy has placed Africa on top of his agenda. 
In a discussion held by the American University in Cairo Tahrir Dialogue, the FM stressed an 
Africa-focused Egypt. Not only did he stress water security, but he also discussed trade and the 
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environment. 
179 
 The South will occupy Egyptian foreign policy in the near future making 
confrontation with Israel less likely.  
Additionally, the internal weakness of Egypt has caused a weak and limited foreign 
policy. Mohamed Morsi’s ouster-- and the subsequent crackdown on the Muslim brotherhood --
has diverted state resources toward internal matters. Historically, a weak Egypt internally has 
been an inward looking. Instability in the Sinai has caused greater strategic cooperation with 
Israel, especially isolating Hamas in the Gaza Strip. This policy represents a turnaround from the 
ousted administration. Egypt’s Eastern threats are changing from a state-centric Israel to a non-
state actor with strong ties to the graver internal threat. Hamas, an offshoot of Egypt’s 
brotherhood, has suffered a terrible setback after the ouster of Morsi and the reemergence of 
security centric regime. This has ushered in a new era of cooperation between Egypt and Israel. 
This cooperation has increased since the unrest in the Sinai. In August 2012, Israeli 
newspaper Haaretz claimed that security cooperation “between Israel and Egypt is perhaps at the 
highest level it has been since the peace agreement was forged by the two nations”.180 After the 
ouster of Morsi, Egyptian troops have stepped up deployments to the Sinai to fight militants 
loyal to Islamists groups. These deployments have targeted tunnel operation between Gaza and 
Sinai. Those operations expanded during the period in which the Morsi administration was in 
power, but since July, the Egyptian military has clamp down on tunnel operations. Recent border 
closings between the Gaza Strip and the Sinai coupled with the destruction of tunnels previously 
used for illegal trade, appear to break the back of Gaza’s Hamas-led government. According to 
the UN special coordinator in the Middle East, the Egyptian military has destroyed nearly 80% 
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of cross-border tunnels.
181
 Despite Hamas’ denial of involvement Sinai unrest, the Egyptian 
military is carrying operations unseen since its wars with Israel. In this instance, Israel and Egypt 
share a common goal of crippling the Islamist organization. Increased security cooperation with 
Israel opens the door for further security cooperation and offers opportunities for regime 
building. The increasing role of the military, combined with Egypt’s weak foreign policy, could 
propel energy cooperation between the two countries. However, Egypt’s internal politics and the 
politics of normalization could act as a hindrance.  
4.3.2 Internal Politics  
Regime formation requires input from domestic political sources. Simmons and Haggard argued 
that “domestic” political issues spill over into international policies and “foreign policy” has 
domestic roots and consequences”.182 To form the foundations of a regime between Cairo and 
Tel Aviv, domestic actors must normalize their relations. Politics in Cairo are as volatile as ever, 
and as a consequence, the predictability of the political events has diminished significantly. More 
recently, however, domestic political events appear to be following the patterns of the 1950s and 
1960s. Such politics could present both threats to and opportunities for Egyptian-Israeli 
cooperation. The Egyptian public has long been against normalization with Israel, especially 
without an advancement of the peace process with the rest of Arabs. However, strategic 
cooperation, as have been shown, is a hallmark in Egyptian-Israeli relations.  
 Shortly after the resignation of President Mubarak, a number of political groups and 
parties have materialized and Egyptians adopted a fascination with politics, political groups and 
personalities. Two years later political parties are not to be heard. The two groups, the Muslim 
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Brotherhood and the state establishment, that have, historically dominated the political scene, 
have a regained their prominence. Shortly before the end of 2013, the Muslim Brotherhood was 
declared a terrorist organization by the Egyptian government.
183
 The declaration and other recent 
events threaten Egyptian stability. The volatile and transitional nature of current Egyptian 
politics leaves very little room for historical precedents. However, the military remains intact and 
more powerful.  
The most recent phenomena in Egyptian domestic politics is the rise of the powerful and 
popular military leader, General Abd El Fattah El Sisi. While very little is known about the 
General’s beliefs, a number of Israeli military leaders have lauded his ability to cooperate with 
Israel. During his presidency, Mohamed Morsi did not deal directly with Israel. That task was 
delegated to his minister of defense, General Sisi. The general is well known to insiders in the 
Israeli security establishment. As the head of military intelligence, Sisi was viewed as very 
cooperative on issues relating to Sinai security.
184
 In his thesis at the Army War College, the 
General rarely mentions Israel, except when he says that the development of democracy in the 
Middle East is complicated by the existence of Israel and democracy will negatively impact 
Israel.
185
  
 As democracy recedes in Egypt and the military generals become more popular, 
cooperation is much more likely. Internal weakness and military strength could facilitate bilateral 
cooperation. However, the need for Egypt to cooperate is very little. Egypt’s natural gas 
resources if further developed can sustain its growth. The biggest winner in Israeli-Egyptian 
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cooperation would be the Damietta LNG plant operator. The LNG plant in Damietta, which 
majority-owned by Spanish Union Fenosa Gas, has been idle since February 2012 and is unlikely 
to return online any time soon.
186
 The LNG plant in Damietta, has only one LNG train; each 
addition of LNG runs nearly US$3 billion.
187  
Israel gas would either be connected via an 
undersea pipeline or by reversing the existing pipeline. Cairo’s energy policy has been sluggish 
in responding to changing natural gas markets and the instability caused by stagnation of 
production and reserves. Egypt’s subsidization of domestic prices has also caused investment to 
decrease dramatically, slowing-down output. Chairman of EGAS, a government owned natural 
gas holding, said that Egypt is not interested in purchasing gas from Israel, and that it would 
rather a rent a re-gasification plant and receive shipments of LNG.
188
 This is a much more 
expensive alternative that importing natural gas from Israel.  
But The Egyptian military would lose a great deal of political capital if it cooperates with 
Israel on natural gas. The military’s campaign against internal “terrorism” requires substantial 
political capital. After the peace deal, Sadat garnered a great deal of political capital and control 
over the military allowing him to sell oil to Israel. Furthermore, Egypt needed the foreign capital 
due to a deteriorating economy. While the same economic conditions exist today, allowing for 
natural gas to be transported and liquefied does not bring the economic benefits of direct sales of 
hydrocarbons.  
 Any repetition of Mubarak’s energy deals would be politically harmful. Natural gas deals 
during the Mubarak era were viewed as heavily corrupt. A re-emergence of such views could 
further weaken the military generals and the political powers in Egypt The emergence of popular 
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politics in Egypt and hyper-nationalism could complicate any process of cooperation. 
Cooperating with Israel to damage the Muslim Brotherhood could be acceptable to a stability 
minded Egyptian public, however, further cooperation with Israel on energy could be deeply 
divisive and politically destructive. A settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially 
Palestinian rights, would provide political capital needed for cooperation and regime building. 
The other alternative would be strong Egyptian leadership able to see the “shadow of future 
cooperation”.   
4.4 Modeling the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Israel’s ability to exploit the riches of the Levant hinges on its ability to develop an export 
strategy. While it can technically and economically develop a strategy independent of regional 
actors, such action would have negative ramifications. The ramifications include increasing 
political tension, the plausibility of miscalculation, and a dangerous realignment of the balance 
of power in the Eastern Mediterranean. Cooperation could be the best long-term strategy for 
Israel and its neighbors because of their repeated interactions. But cooperation requires 
compromise. The opportunities and incentives for actors in the Levant Basin to cooperate or 
defect are many. Cooperation on any side would require territorial compromise that has long-
held down the region’s prosperity.  
As we have explained, Axelrod’s concept of tit-for-tat presents the best strategy for 
cooperation. This strategy is predicated on players acting “nice” rather than acting ‘clever’. 
When a player cooperates, the other player acts reciprocally. Entering the arrangement of initial 
cooperation is rather difficult since defection is the safest strategy. Actors are hesitant to 
cooperate because if they cooperate and the other actors choose to defect, the cooperators are 
much worse off than if they each defect.  The calculation of actors is that DC>CC>DD>CD. The 
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political leadership of each country calculates decisions regarding cooperation or defection. This 
is not always the best interest of the “state” but it is the best-perceived interest for the political 
leadership.
189
 In IPD, political leaders incentives are altered by “lengthening the shadow of the 
future” in order for cooperative behavior to payoff.190 
In an IPD it may be possible to resolve the dilemma. Players must believe in three main 
conditions: 1) players must settle for less initial gain, 2) players must believe that the other side 
will cooperate, 3) players cooperation hinges on the belief that future interactions are likely. I 
will use Axelrod’s discount parameter as heuristic technique to present a model illustrating the 
dilemmas of common-interest based cooperatives. According to Axelrod discount parameter (1-
w), players may calculate that the gains of DC is less than an endless number of future CC/(1-w), 
where w is the measure of importance of each move to the next move
191
. For instance, if a player 
calculate that the gain of DC is 5 and the gain of CC is 3, the player would choose to cooperate 
or DC<CC/(1-w) if w= at least .40 or 40%. The closer the spread between perceived gains of DC 
in comparison to CC, the greater the likelihood of cooperation. For this experiment to work the 
perceptions of risk need to be as low as possible and the perception of future interactions or 1-w 
must be sufficiently high. These gains are a sum of political values and financial values. The 
challenge is to recognize the environment of the players and the choices available to them. 
Additionally, the players perceived risks from cooperation and importance of gains from 
defecting. As Krasner argued, “regime-governed behavior must not be based solely on short-term 
calculations of interests”.192 
Among the most integral challenges of cooperation is balancing between Israel’s 
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different policy objectives and the high cost of natural gas infrastructure. Since regimes are 
created to cut transaction costs, therefore, the initial cost of investment in cooperation matters 
politically as well as economically. Israel’s investors and politicians are faced with a dilemma 
between market accessibility,
193
 cost,
194
 and political freedom.
195
 Infrastructure options costs are 
as follows: 1) export to Egypt at an estimated investment cost of US$450m for the required 
pipeline,
196
 2) export to Turkey at an estimated cost of US$2.5b, 3) export through Cyprus at an 
estimated cost of US$9b, 4) export by building a floating LNG plant on Israel’s maritime 
territory estimated at US$10-12b. The most expensive project, the floating LNG, has the lowest 
risk because it keeps open various responses to political and economic conditions. Cypriot plan 
offers market accessibility but it is against Israel’s policy objectives of having territorial control 
over the LNG plant. Egypt’s route offers market accessibility since Egypt is both an export 
destination and an export platform with LNG capacity; however, Israel then risks having the 
Egyptian route as its only option for natural gas. Turkey offers some market accessibility in 
terms of Turkish and European markets but very little political control and great geopolitical 
risk.  
In our analysis, paying attention to the chessboard available to the players is very 
important. In IPD, unlike one-time action payoffs, it is rather a repeated game between two 
players and in our case simultaneous games being played involving different players. In this 
thesis, I refer to these different games as the “environment of players”.  Each player acts within 
its own environment, which impacts the decisions of their game with the opposite player. For 
instance, Turkey is simultaneously negotiating a settlement with Cyprus while Israel negotiates a 
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settlement with the Palestinians.  These negotiations directly contribute to our 2-player games. 
Players (i.e. Israel, Turkey, and Egypt) are looking at these different games to understand their 
next moves on the bilateral chessboard. Simultaneously, firms that have invested in exploring 
natural gas are advocating a quick profitable solution. While the Egyptian route produces the 
best return on investment, building an FLNG could be the most politically appealing route to 
Israeli politicians. Variables of relative return on investment, market accessibility, and political 
expediency play a role in calculating the different moves on the chessboard.  The first dilemma 
we analyze is the Israeli-Turkish game.  
4.4.1 Turkish-Israeli PD 
The conditions for cooperation between Turkey and Israel are: Turkey makes a final compromise 
on the Cypriot-Turkish dispute paving the way for a pipeline to traverse Cypriot territorial 
waters. Israel would compromise by agreeing to the pipeline, which limits the flexibility of an 
LNG plant but guarantees a growing Turkish market and future energy sales to Europe’s market.  
The conditions for Turkish defection and Israeli cooperation are: Turkey makes initial 
compromises with Cyprus to agree on pipeline traversing its territorial waters. Israel agrees and 
builds the pipeline, then Turkey reneges on its earlier deal and fails to conclude a final 
settlement, thereby leaving Israel stuck with its jointly owned pipeline and beholden to it as the 
only export option. Israel is worse off in such scenario because it initial policy objectives were to 
avoid territorial disputes and entanglements. Further complications between Cyprus and Turkey 
would threaten Israel’s exports.  
The conditions of Israel defection and Turkish cooperation is as follows: Turkey 
compromises and creates a final settlement with Cyprus believing that such a settlement will 
make Israel cooperate on natural gas. On the other hand, Israel sticks to its initial policy 
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objectives of assuring maximum flexibility economically in terms of global market access by 
cooperating with Cyprus on an LNG plant or by assuring complete political control by building a 
more expensive FLNG inside its territorial waters.  
Defection for Israel and Turkey means that Israel will not have access to Turkish and 
European markets at a inexpensive cost of a pipeline and Turkey will be unable to further 
diversify its natural gas imports and build the geopolitically valuable web of energy connections.  
Israel 
Turkey 
C D 
C 
● Pipeline investment 
● Geopolitical strength 
● Domestic supply and new 
energy markets. 
● Increased regional security 
cooperation. 
● Turkey makes initial 
agreements with Cyprus, in-
return Cyprus agrees to let the 
pipeline go through Cypriot 
territory, Israel cooperates but 
Turkey defects on agreements 
with Cyprus  
● Turkey gets natural gas, 
despite Cypriot objections, but 
Israel is beholden to Turkey as 
its only export route. 
D 
● Turkey compromises with 
Cyprus.  
● Israel defects and invests 
with Cyprus because it 
offers Israeli firms more 
flexibility in shipping routes 
and now more security in 
terms of Cypriot-Turkish 
settlement. 
● Israel does not access the 
Turkish market but has other 
options to export natural gas. 
● Turkey’s does not diversify 
natural gas imports nor does it 
grow its geopolitically strategic 
energy hub. 
Table 1, Turkey-Israel PD 
4.4.2 Egypt-Israeli PD 
Israeli cooperation with Egypt requires less initial investment by either party as Egypt’s LNG 
exporting platform offers greater accessibility to global market. Inexpensive access to this 
platform is an important driver for investors. Egypt’s LNG facilities and low costs of connecting 
a pipeline could make it an ideal choice for investors of Leviathan and Tamar. However, Egypt’s 
recent history of defecting from the contract to supply Israel’s natural gas does not show ‘nice’ 
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behavior for the potential cooperator. Despite Egypt previous behavior, it remains a strategic 
choice economically. On the other hand, the weakness of internal Egyptian politics, hyper-
nationalism, and the increasingly vulnerable security situation makes it a tough sell. Cooperation 
with Egypt would have to come with certain inducements of progress on the peace process that 
might reduce the political risks of engagement. 
Conditions of Egypt-Israeli cooperation are as follows: Israel and Palestine make 
sufficient progress toward final settlement to induce Egypt to cooperate. Egypt would commit to 
securing Israel’s pipelines and receive its natural gas imports from Israel. Strategically, Israel 
becomes beholden to Egypt. Egypt will be the receiver of Israeli exports for domestic 
consumption and the outlet for Israeli gas to global markets. 
Conditions of Egyptian defection and Israeli cooperation are as follows: Israel makes 
good on its peace promises while Egypt still decides that it is too risky to import Israeli gas for 
domestic political reasons. Additionally, Egypt makes good on domestic market reforms 
increasing domestic supply of natural gas or decides to import natural gas from abroad at lower 
cost from gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia. Egypt could initially work with Israel but decides 
to annul the contract as it has done previously.  
Conditions of Egypt cooperation and Israel defection: Egypt cooperates with Israel as the 
peace process seems to take positive steps, however, no final settlement is concluded. Israel opts 
for a more expensive but politically more desirable method of exporting natural gas. Egyptian 
politicians lose political capital and delay domestic market reforms.  
Defection for both countries means that Israel losses the best economic option of 
exporting natural gas and Egypt will be unable to have access to Israeli gas. Israeli gas could be 
important as source for domestic consumption or as investment to re-operate the Damietta plant. 
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Israel 
Egypt 
C D 
C 
● Israel compromises on 
peace process/Egypt’s 
politicians can sell working 
with Israel as part of peace. 
● Egypt would receive foreign 
investment. 
● Egypt would receive natural 
gas at a cheaper price/Israel 
would sell natural gas 
efficiently. 
● Israel would have access to 
LNG facilities providing 
greater market 
flexibility/Egypt would re-
start those LNG facilities 
 
● Israel compromises on the 
Palestinian issue. 
● Egypt defects by buying 
natural gas from other 
destinations. 
● Egypt political actors gain 
political capital by shunning 
Israel even after a compromise 
with the Palestinians. 
D 
● If Egypt cooperates, without 
Israel continuing effective 
steps in the peace process, 
Egypt risks alienating 
domestic constituents and 
Arab partners, while Israel 
gets access to markets with 
carrying out regional 
compromises. 
● In case of defection, both gain 
nothing and they both lose an 
opportunity for collaboration. 
Table 2, Egypt-Israel PD 
4.5 External Powers 
Exports of Israeli natural gas and the riches of the Mediterranean are of great importance not 
only to the countries in the region but also to great powers. The United States, the European 
Union, and Russia have showed great interests in East Mediterranean riches, however, each of 
them has their own interests. Their leverage is part of any dilemma that these countries face in 
their decision-making processes. Great powers have had a great impact on cooperation in this 
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region, especially security cooperation and energy cooperation. The U.S. Johnston mission in the 
1950s tried but failed to secure regime cooperation between Levant countries over water 
allocation. The energy opportunities in the Levant basin could present yet another effective tool 
to enhance cooperative behavior. The EU, US, would likely welcome cooperation. On the other 
hand, Russia role is to play spoiler in any deal that would involve exports to Europe.  
The EU and the United States have similar visions of the Eastern Mediterranean. The EU 
has a number of interests in the development of the natural gas sector. EU member countries 
overreliance on Russian energy is a strategic flaw to an independent Europe. The EU is seeking 
to develop strategic diversification. Brussels has already indicated its partnership with former 
Soviet countries such as Azerbaijan and partnerships with countries in North Africa especially 
Libya and Algeria continue. The riches of the Levant offer another excellent opportunity to 
diversify its energy resources.  
The EU has an interest in also maintaining security in the Eastern Mediterranean. Greece, 
Italy, France, and Spain do not want to see a naval arms race on their backdoor. Increase in 
tension, especially between Israel and Turkey, could drag Cyprus and possibly Greece into a 
wider conflict. The United States continues to be the region’s predominant naval power. The US 
has a great interest in the stability of the region, especially preventing an arms race between its 
two best allies, Israel and Turkey, and increasing cooperation between Israel and its neighbors 
has always been Washington’s intention. 
More recently the sovereign debt crisis and the non-performing southern economies of 
the EU have posed the greatest threat to the cohesion of the super-national entity. Greece and 
Cyprus have suffered through fiscal austerity and low economic growth. The riches of the Levant 
could present an opportunity for these countries to capitalize on natural resources and stimulate 
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their economies. The weak Cypriot economy could use EU stimulus to build an LNG facility,
197
 
this could be conditioned on accepting a peace agreement with Turkish Cyprus.  
Encouraging cooperation between the countries in the region could also assist in the 
ongoing peace process. The Kerry peace negotiations could be Washington’s last effort for an 
agreement through the current framework. Since the start of the peace process Israel has signaled 
that it will allow the cash strapped Palestinian Authority (PA) to monetize the offshore gas fields 
discovered off the coast of Gaza.
198
 More recently, the PA electric company signed a deal that 
would make it the first foreign purchaser from Tamar gas field production. However, the deal 
will only occur when a power plant is built in the West Bank.
199
 Cooperation on energy issues 
could produce the right linkages to decrease the opportunities for conflict among countries in the 
region if the peace process fails. On the other hand, success of the peace process could assist 
Washington in creating a web of cooperation in the region between its partners to promote its 
political and security agenda.  
The United States will most likely be interested in playing a role of cooperation on the 
high seas. Washington can coordinate and facilitate maritime activities between its two most 
strategic allies in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, Washington and Brussels’ greatest 
leverage comes from their ability to mediate for peaceful settlements between Cyprus and 
Turkey or the Arab-Israeli conflict. Cyprus could demand that in case of a settlement, Israel and 
Turkey must agree to make commitments to fund a Cypriot LNG plant. Cyprus decides to play 
the role of spoiler by not agreeing on Turkish-Israeli cooperation or not settling the Cypriot-
Turkish conflict, which could further restrict Cypriot exploration activities.  
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 Russia has significantly different interests in the Levant than the EU and the US. Losing 
market share or increased competition from firms operating in the Eastern Mediterranean is not 
in Russia’s interest. Initially Gazprom (government owned energy firm) seemed to be on track to 
own rights for Cypriot natural gas production. But under EU pressure, Cyprus decided to end 
negotiations with the company.
200
 Gazprom has also displayed strong interest in Israeli gas. In 
February 2013, the company signed a letter of intent on the Tamar field that would make it a 
substantial owner and to build a liquefied natural gas station.
201
 Multiple reports suggested that 
the Russian firm, with heavy lobbying from the government, is trying to gain favorable terms 
that would include a “deal” where Israel will promise not to export natural gas to Europe.202 
These talks have not produced any concrete results and are likely off the table. Russia’s position 
is to be a spoiler in any deal that would send natural gas to the EU.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Resolving the long drawn-out territorial disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean continue to 
hamper economic opportunities. The natural gas discoveries present great opportunities for 
regime building in the Levant. Under the best conditions, planning for Israel’s export policy 
could have been fairly simple. Israel could send natural gas to Egypt’s LNG plant for a very 
small investment and build a pipeline to Turkey simultaneously. These two options together 
present Israel with access to Asian market through liquefied natural gas and use the least 
expensive method of exporting natural gas to Turkey and EU markets. Creating a web of natural 
gas interconnections could foster greater security cooperation and eventually cause a spillover 
effect. While the conditions of 2014 are substantially better for cooperation than the conditions 
of 2012, cooperation continues to face geopolitical and internal pressure. Israel is likely to defect 
rather than cooperate with either Turkey or Egypt. The long-time horizon of concluding regional 
settlements along with the increasing costs of inactivity will cause companies to invest in the 
least politically risky option, sidestepping any regional cooperation. 
5.1  Failure of Israeli-Turkish cooperation 
Israel policy objectives will find defection as the most suitable option in light of the continued 
wrangling between Cyprus and Turkey. Israel will conclude that cooperating with either Turkey 
or Cyprus could increase geopolitical risk. Turkey will conclude that the risks of compromising 
with Greek Cyprus are too great for the sake of obtaining new natural gas supplies. In its 
calculations, Turkey believes that in the future it could find energy resources on Turkish Cypriot 
territory and a compromise would allow Israel to easily work with Cyprus on an LNG plant. 
Turkey could assume that Israeli cooperation with Cyprus would be triggered if the territorial 
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disagreement were settled. Turkish officials are worried about the increase in cooperation 
between Israel, Greek Cyprus and Greece. Turkish compromise with Cyprus could open the door 
for deepened cooperation. A new alliance on the eastern Mediterranean supported by the United 
States could engineer a rebalancing of power in the region.  
5.2 Failure of Israel-Egyptian cooperation 
Firms operating the natural gas fields will continue to explore the Egyptian route. However, 
politics and insecurity will stand in the way of long term planning. Natural gas infrastructure is 
based on long-term agreements. Political uncertainties in Cairo along with the increasing security 
risks will make such agreement untenable. The political environment in Cairo does not allow its 
policymakers to see the consequences of defection. Rather than cooperation, Cairo’s 
policymakers are shortsighted and unable to see the role of natural gas discoveries in repeated 
interactions. On the other hand, Israel’s politicians find the risks from defection inconsequential. 
Israel’s policymakers see greater risk in cooperating on a peace agreement with the Palestinians 
than in developing a gas regime with Egypt. 
5.3 Consequences of Defection 
Israel’s growing power compared to its neighbors could lead to negative consequences. Israel’s 
energy independence will bring many positive changes to the country’s economy. But increasing 
economic wealth could contribute to a heightened threat perception by other regional powers. 
Inadequate cooperation on the high seas will increase the risk of miscalculation. Israel will 
continue purchasing naval equipment to secure natural gas facilities. On the other hand, Turkey 
will counteract Israel increasing naval upgrades by its own naval buildup to maintain the balance 
of power. The possibilities of an arms race on the Eastern Mediterranean will considerably 
increase as these nations vie for supremacy on the high seas. The inability of Cairo and Tel Aviv 
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to cooperate is another missed opportunity for normalization. The likelihood of miscalculation 
will only increase without regulation and coordination between these regional powers. 
5.4  Conclusion 
This thesis analyzed the different political players’ priorities and perceptions of the political 
environments in dealing with the natural gas boom in the Eastern Mediterranean. It spelled out 
their respective dilemmas of common interest in building gas regimes. The model of an iterated 
prisoner’s dilemma was a useful analytic tool for envisioning the various possibilities for long-
term cooperation and their associated risks. The historical relations between players obviously 
condition their current environment. Investigating the environments that caused these players to 
cooperate in the past supply a reference point for the current political environment. 
The current geopolitical and internal environments in the region deter cooperation 
patterns. Cooperation between Turkey and Israel is unlikely due territorial geopolitical conflict 
over Cyprus. Cooperation between Egypt and Israel is unlikely because of the internal weakness 
of Egypt’s policymakers. Regional territorial conflict exacerbates perceived security threats 
making cooperation difficult. External powers can act by inducing several actors to take the risks 
associated with cooperation. The United States ability to reach an agreement between the Israelis 
and Palestinians would create the viable political climate between Israel and Egypt. The EU’s 
growing influence on a weak Cyprus could entice them to cooperate with Turkey. Russia, 
however, will continue to use their political and economic clout to disturb future partnerships 
that would result European imports of Israeli natural gas. Without cooperation and lack of 
coordination, these security threats are likely to increase creating numerous geopolitical crises in 
the region. The maritime territorial conflict will worsen. The imbalance of power will allow 
Israel to escape a solution, which further increases tension. Turkey will continue to wreck havoc 
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on Cypriot waters. Without an immediate solution, tensions and suspicions will only increase. 
Unresolved territorial and maritime disputes often lead to conflict. The dissipation of hegemonic 
powers in the region could alter the balance of power. The shifting of alliances on Eastern 
Mediterranean, apparent in increasing cooperation between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus, coupled 
with historical and regional rivalries is a disastrous recipe for the region.  
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